Motives and Giving Norms Behind Remittances: the Case of Filipino Overseas Workers and their Recipient Households by Michael M. Alba & Jessaine Soraya C. Sugui
 




PMMA Working Paper 2011-01 
Motives and Giving Norms 
Behind Remittances:  
The Case of Filipino Overseas 
Workers and their Recipient 
Households 
 
Michael M. Alba                               
Jessaine Soraya C. Sugui 
 
January 2011 
Michael Alba (Philippine Institute of Development Studies, 
Manila, Philippines) michael.alba@gmail.com               
Jessaine Soraya Sugui (Asian Development Bank, Manila, 
Philippines) sjessaine@yahoo.com  
Abstract
  
The literature has focused on motives to explain remittance behavior. But as non-
anonymous transfers, remittances are liable to be influenced by giving norms as 
well. We formulate an empirical specification that takes account of remittance 
motives involving worker-household pairs. We find that altruism dominates the 
exchange motive  among  overseas workers  who  are likely to be the primary 
breadwinners of their recipient households. We also find that, in the subsample in 
which overseas workers are likely to be secondary breadwinners, (a) household 
labor income is an endogenous explanatory variable and (b) the error covariance 
of the household income and remittance selection  equations is positive. A 
possible reason for (a) is that secondary breadwinners use household income as 
an imperfect signal of opportunity cost or to detect unobserved effort, i.e., moral 
hazard,  in  generating  income.  As for (b), we surmise that it indicates the 
presence of incentive-compatible mechanisms against moral hazard. On giving 
norms, we find that in samples that include overseas workers who are secondary 
breadwinners, remittance amounts are afflicted with negative selectivity. We 
present evidence that this is consistent with Filipino giving practices, in which 
everyone gives but in modest amounts. 
Keywords: Remittances, remittance motives, giving norms. 
 
JEL classification: F24 
   
                                                             
This work was carried out with financial and scientific support from the Poverty and Economic Policy 
(PEP) Research Network, which is financed by the Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID) and the Government of Canada through the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). We are grateful to the DLSU-
Angelo King Institute for Business and Economic Studies and the Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies (PIDS) for providing us with office space and, in the case of PIDS, for giving us ready access 
to its library and computer support services. We also thank Aniceto Orbeta Jr. for generously 
“wasting” his time on econometric discussions with us, Emmanuel Esguerra for tracking down the 
bibliographic information on the undated Fabella essay, and Mary Shirley for her comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. Pramila Krishanan and Hung Thai Pham were our discussants during the 
December 2008 PEP General Meeting in Manila. Their incisive observations were most helpful in 
challenging and clarifying our understanding of many issues, thus (we hope) vastly improving this 
version of the paper. We owe them a debt of gratitude.  1 
 
1.  Introduction 
Teeming masses of workers streaming across national borders; torrents of remittances 
rushing back to the workers’ countries of origin: These twin phenomena are among the most 
impressive forces that are shaping and are being shaped by the process of globalization 
today. United Nations estimates in 2000, cited in Kapur and McHale (2003) and by the World 
Bank (2006), placed the number of international migrants at between 150 and 175 million, or 
at 3 percent of the world’s population.
1 In developed countries where their numbers grew at 
3 percent per year between 1980 and 2000, from 2.4 percent per year between 1970 and 
1980, immigrants almost doubled their share in the population over the 30-year period. 
Concomitantly, remittances to developing countries have inexorably risen, from $17.7 billion 
in 1980 to $31.2 billion in 1990 to $85.6 billion in 2000 and $301 billion in 2006.
2 
These vastly shifting currents of men and monies notwithstanding, international migration 
and transfers are still not well understood. Who in the pool of migrants remit, to whom 
transfers are sent, in what amounts (and whether it is their  nominal or real values that 
matter), with what regularity, and for how long are questions that as yet do not have stock 
answers. But the importance of resolving them cannot be overemphasized. As de la Brière 
et al. (2002) point out, distinguishing the different motives behind remittances affords 
understanding of the role these transfers play in the strategic behavior of households. 
Remittances may not merely be an additional source of income for the recipient households; 
they can be payments for services rendered to the migrant, payoffs of an insurance scheme 
that shields recipients from income shocks, returns on household investments in the 
migrants’ human capital (including location), migrants’ investment in inheritable assets, or 
various combinations thereof.   
Moreover, the policy implications of alternative motives can be very different. An 
economic shock that causes unemployment rates to rise in a remittance-receiving country, 
for instance, can be expected to increase both the incidence and the amounts of remittances 
if these funds are altruistically motivated (i.e., the migrants care for the recipients), but to 
reduce amounts remitted without necessarily affecting their frequency if transfers are 
payments for services rendered by the recipients (because their bargaining power 
diminishes). Thus, safety net schemes require more government and domestic resources to 
                                                             
1 Since the estimates are drawn from official census figures of destination countries, the World Bank 
deems even the 150 million estimate to be on the low end, contending that undocumented aliens are 
not likely to be forthcoming about their legal status. 
2 These estimates have to be taken with caution because, as the World Bank (2006) points out, there 
is as yet no consensus on what constitutes remittances, and, as IFAD (2007) observes, a significant 
proportion of the flows go through informal channels. The estimates cited come from Kapur and 
McHale (2003) for 1980, World Bank (2006) for 1990 and 2000, and IFAD (2007) for 2006. No 
attempt was made to determine the comparability of the data. 2 
 
be mobilized if remittance inflows are service payments than if they represent charitable 
giving. On the other hand, government subsidies in education may need to be reexamined if 
emigration is found to be an investment in a higher income stream by the worker and her 
origin household, and schooling choices are part of a decision chain that culminates in brain 
drain. Specifically, policy requires that the full costs of training in careers (say, in nursing and 
medicine) that are pursued outside the country have to be fully borne by would-be emigrants 
to the extent that the origin country is unable to reap the social returns of such investments 
in human capital.   
What the literature has also failed to realize thus far is that, being non-anonymous 
transactions, remittances may  be governed by giving norms.  In other words, remittance 
behavior may not be fully accounted for by motives alone, but may be framed by norms on 
giving of a community as well. Thus, remittance behavior may be constrained by informal 
and implicit rules  that specify, say,  the circumstances under which transfers may be 
expected, who may be the giving and receiving parties, and how much may be given. This 
perspective  (that remittances are circumscribed by norms),  in turn,  has its own policy 
implications for a developing economy that is dependent on remittance inflows. For instance, 
if  norms prescribe that  it is giving  that matters  (i.e., everyone is expected to give),  but 
amounts given may  be  modest,  then interventions may focus on  increasing average 
remittance amounts (e.g., by imposing a minimum amount requirement or setting a declining 
tax rate or transaction fee on transfer amounts). On the other hand, if norms stipulate that 
giving ought to be confined to a small circle of close relations, but amounts given should be 
substantial, then policies may need to be designed to help migrant workers save (e.g., by 
offering special deposit accounts that have higher interest rates, but also exact large 
penalties if funds are withdrawn before minimal levels are reached). 
This paper explores the correlates of remittances. To do so, it formulates an empirical 
specification of remittance incidence and amounts that takes account of the various motives 
involving worker-household pairs that are found in the literature.  The  specification is 
developed  for a cross-section data set drawn from the 2003 Family Income and 
Expenditures Survey (FIES) and the 2003 Survey of Overseas Filipinos (SOF) that matches 
the overseas worker with the origin  or recipient household  (since remittances are not 
anonymous transfers that depend on price and income signals alone). Because the literature 
suggests that household labor income is potentially an endogenous explanatory variable, the 
paper also presents a framework for testing this hypothesis in the remittance equations and 
provides for alternative estimation strategies, depending on the test outcomes.  
Since the structural models that are derived require the estimation of error covariances, 
e.g., of remittance selection and amounts, or of the household income and the remittance 3 
 
equations, this feature is exploited by providing conjectures on what influences these 
covariances may be picking up. In particular, we interpret the correlation of the error terms of 
the remittance selection and amounts equations as reflecting the influence of Filipino norms 
on giving, and we provide evidence on Filipino giving practices to support this claim. 
To address the possible heterogeneity of overseas workers with respect to remittance 
motives and contractual terms, we implement the hypothesis tests and the estimation of the 
empirical model on three groups of overseas workers and their households: the entire 
sample, the subsample consisting of overseas workers who are either household heads or 
spouses of heads, and the subsample consisting of overseas workers who are neither heads 
nor spouses of heads. The reasoning behind this strategy is that heads and their spouses 
are not likely to be impelled  by investment and inheritance motives. Moreover, their 
remittance behavior may be dominated by the altruistic motive, which lowers their relative 
bargaining power (in the exchange motive) and which may cause them not to care very 
much about whether household income is tainted by moral hazard due to unobserved effort 
(in the insurance motive). 
The focus on the Philippines is justified on the following grounds: The country has been 
one of the largest exporters of labor and, consequently, has benefited from strong remittance 
inflows. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Philippine central bank, reports that between 2000 
and 2008, the country’s remittance receipts rose by more than two-fold, from $6.1 billion to 
$16.4 billion, and that these transfers in 2008 were ranked by the World Bank to have been 
the fourth largest in the world. For the Philippine economy and the recipient households, the 
importance of these remittance flows cannot be overstated. In 2008, the transfers accounted 
for about 9.7  percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 13.8  percent of personal 
consumption expenditure, and 25.7 percent of total exports.
3 Data from the 2003 FIES also 
indicate that roughly over 20 percent of households received income transfers from abroad.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section develops the empirical 
framework based on considerations culled from a survey of remittance motives that is 
provided in Appendix 1. The third section presents the data set and variables. The fourth 
section discusses our empirical findings, while the fifth argues that the negative correlation of 
the error terms of the remittance selection and amounts equations is consistent with other 
evidence on Filipino giving norms. The last section provides concluding remarks. 
                                                             
3 See www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics.  4 
 
2.  Empirical Model 
Table 1 lists five remittance motives that, based on our survey of the literature, have to 
be accounted for in exploring the remittance behavior of worker-household pairs. The table 
also  summarizes the specific hypotheses of each  of these competing explanations for 
remittances and identifies the explanatory variables. A more detailed discussion of these 
motives is provided in Appendix 1. 
From  table  1 (and the survey undertaken in Appendix 1), we draw the following 
implications for our empirical specification: First, it is likely that remittances are induced by a 
variety of motives in a sample of worker-household pairs and even for a given worker-
household pair. Indeed, as is pointed out in table  1, to be operative, the insurance and 
investment motives have to be supported by other considerations (including possibly other 
motives). Thus, the structural model must be sufficiently general to admit the competing 
motives.  
Second,  as has been mentioned, remittances are not  anonymous transactions, 
behavioral information on which can be summarized by costs, incomes, and prices. Rather, 
they are manifestations of underlying relationships between workers and households. 
Consequently, the explanatory variables of remittance equations must include characteristics 
of both parties that possibly reflect the relationship. Otherwise, the specification may be 
tainted with omitted variable bias. 
Third, remittance behavior is best studied using a (long) panel data set, since only then 
can the motives be differentiated using the incidence, regularity of recurrence (or lack 
thereof), duration,  and amounts of remittances, on the one hand, and changes in 
environmental circumstances on the other. Indeed, it is particularly difficult to discern the 
exchange and insurance motives with cross-section data.  
Consider the exchange motive, for example. Assuming that all worker-household pairs 
face the same environmental conditions, household pre-transfer labor incomes are either 
positively or negatively correlated with remittance amounts. Positive (Negative) correlation 
holds if the contracted services and household consumption are independent (complements) 
in household preferences. For the researcher, empirically verifying the preference relations 
of consumption and contracted services is thus  a necessary step for  the relationship 
between remittances and household pre-transfer income to be interpreted correctly. 
However, information on services undertaken for the migrant worker tends to be unavailable. 
On the other hand, if random shocks are allowed (which have the effect of changing the 
contractual terms  for some worker-household pairs), it is virtually impossible to make 
household comparisons using cross-section data. For instance, (assuming that consumption 5 
 
and services rendered are independent in preferences) remittances may decline because 
either household incomes decrease  (say, because some members of the households 
concerned lost their jobs, which lowers the households’ bargaining power or opportunity 
costs) or locale- or sector-specific conditions take a negative turn (say, because of higher 
unemployment rates in occupations of some household members, even if household 
incomes are not affected).
4 Not privy to household (income and remittance) histories and 
changing environmental conditions, the researcher may not be able to find a systematic 
association between remittances and household incomes. 
A similar argument can be made for the insurance motive. Assuming that the same 
environmental conditions prevail across worker-household pairs, remittances flow only in 
one direction (to workers if domestic conditions are good and to households if bad) or do not 
occur. With random shocks, however, high-income households may be recipients of 
remittance inflows and low-income households may be sources of transfers because the 
former suffered from a negative income  shock while the latter benefited from a positive 
shock.     
Thus, with a cross-section data set, researchers have to be sensitive to the limits of what 
can and cannot be explored. In particular, it is a mistake to conflate a cross-section effect 
(i.e., a systematic variation across households at a point in time) and a longitudinal effect 
(i.e., a systematic variation in a household over time).
5  
The upshot of this discussion then is that it may be impossible to sort out remittance 
motives with cross-section data. The best (and more modest) outcome that researchers can 
hope for with such data is that they are able to obtain unbiased estimates of correlates of 
remittance behavior. 
                                                             
4  In the exchange model, the key factor that explains remittance amounts is the household’s 
opportunity cost or bargaining power. Given a set of prevailing conditions at a point in time, this 
bargaining power is proxied by household pre-transfer income, so that household income and 
remittance amounts would be positively or negatively correlated, depending on the nature of the 
household’s preference relations between consumption and services rendered. Holding its pre-
transfer income fixed over time, however, a household’s bargaining power may change with changes 
in environmental conditions. In effect, with cross-section data, the relationship between remittance 
amounts and household incomes may be muddled by the omitted variable effects of changing 
environmental conditions.  
5  An example is a regression of remittance amount using cross-section data whose specification 
includes an environmental variable such as provincial or district employment rate, the hypothesis 
being that (under the exchange motive) employment rate as a measure of opportunity cost has a 
direct bearing on remittance amounts. Such a specification, however, fails to appreciate a fine point in 
the hypothesized relationship: at a given point in time, the effect of environmental conditions is fully 
reflected in the positive or negative correlation between household labor income and remittances, so 
that environmental indicators are redundant or ignorable in a cross-section setting. Only when 
environmental conditions facing a given household change over time (in effect changing the 
parameters of the implicit contract) will they then have an effect on remittances beyond what is 
accounted for by temporal changes in household labor income.   6 
 
Fourth,  the discussion in Appendix  1  of  the  exchange,  insurance,  and investment 
motives suggests that household pre-transfer (labor) income is potentially an endogenous 
explanatory variable in the remittance equations for at least two reasons: It is a correlate of 
household opportunity costs and relative bargaining powers (in the exchange motive), which 
may not be fully accounted for in the specification, and it is affected by unobserved effort, 
i.e., moral hazard, in generating income (in the insurance and investment motives).
6  
Fifth, following the empirical literature on remittances, we do not address the issue of 
migrant selection, i.e., who among the household members is assigned to migrate. Instead, 
we simply take the worker-household pairs as given. The estimates presented in this paper 
thus hold conditional on the pool of migrants being given; they may not be true for the 
Filipino population in general. 
Sixth, the models suggest that remittance incidence and amounts may be explained by 
different factors, including unobserved influences. Under the exchange and investment 
motives, for instance, household income does not affect the frequency with which 
remittances are sent (which is set by contractual terms), but is positively correlated with 
remittance amounts (in the case of the investment motive or when, in the exchange motive, 
consumption and services rendered are independent in household preferences) or has a 
negative effect on the same (when, in the exchange motive, consumption and services 
rendered are complements in preferences). On the other hand, a random shock such as 
having a co-worker who goes on home leave may increase both remittance frequency (as 
these colleagues are used as conduits) and amounts because of lower transaction costs. If 
so, to address the second issue, the specification must allow for endogenous selection, 
since remittance amounts may not be independent of remittance incidence. But to be 
consistent with the implications of the first issue, it must  not restrict the coefficients of 
explanatory variables to be identical in both the selection and amounts equations, which 
invalidates the Tobit model.  
Seventh, the theoretical accounts of remittance motives, unfortunately, do not provide 
any leads on instrumental variables that can be used to identify remittance incidence from 
remittance amounts in a model of endogenous selection. This leaves identification on the 
                                                             
6 We are less concerned with the endogeneity of asset incomes. Since our data are on workers who 
have not been away for a long time (i.e., they left the country between October 1998 and September 
2003), we believe that recipient households have not had sufficient time to use remittances to build up 
their assets. Moreover, times were relatively difficult for Filipino households in the aftermath of the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and conditions were not conducive to saving and investment in the early 
2000s because of the political turmoil that forced the resignation of President Joseph Estrada in 
January 2001.  7 
 
basis of functional form as the only estimation strategy, as was resorted to in Funkhouser 
(1995) and Menjivar et al. (1998).  
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where y1 is the natural logarithm of the amount remitted, y2 is remittance incidence, 1(⋅) 
is an indicator function that equals 1 when the condition inside the parenthesis is satisfied, x 
is the set of regressors common to (1) and (2), which are explained in detail in the next 
section, β, θ, γ1, and γ2 are parameters to be estimated, u and ε are error terms, and y3 is the 
natural logarithm of the recipient household’s labor income, which is potentially an 
endogenous explanatory variable, so that it is suspected that E(y3u) ≠ 0 and E(y3ε) ≠ 0. 
The procedure used to estimate the parameters of the model therefore depends on 
whether or not household labor income is an endogenous explanatory variable in either (1) 
or (2) or both. If it is not, the model is a standard Heckman selection model, which can be 
readily estimated by canned routines. If it is, then adjustments have to be made for 
unobserved heterogeneity arising from the correlations between y3 and the error terms. (See 
Rivers and Vuong, 1988, and Wooldridge, 2002: 472–477 and 567–570.)  
Testing the endogeneity of the recipient household’s labor income being an important 
step prior to parameter estimation, we adopt the following framework, which extends 
Wooldridge (2002: 567–570): Assume that there are instruments z = [x′ z1′]′ such that E(z′u) 
= E(z′ε) = 0. Let the linear projection of y3 on z be given by  
y3 = π′z + v  (3) 
E(z′v) = 0,  (4) 
where (u, ε, v) have a trivariate normal distribution with zero means and V(ε) = E(ε
2) is 
normalized to be equal to unity, which allows θ and γ2 in (2) to be identified. Since u and ε 
are uncorrelated with z, (3) implies that y3 is endogenous in (1) and (2) if and only if E(uv) ≠ 
0 and E(εv) ≠ 0. 
Write the linear projections of u and ε onto v in error form as 8 
 
u = τ1v + ϖ1  (5) 
ε = τ2v + ϖ2,  (6) 
where τ1 = E(uv)/[E(u
2)E(v
2)], τ2 = E(εv)/E(v
2), E(vϖ1) = E(vϖ2) = 0 (by construction), and 
E(z′ϖ1) = E(z′ϖ2) = 0 (since z is orthogonal to u, ε, and v). In effect, y3 is exogenous if and 
only if τ1 = 0 and τ2 = 0. 
Insert (5) and (6) into (1) and (2) to obtain 
( )
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Since ϖ1 and ϖ2 are not correlated with z1, y3, and v, (7) and (8) can be estimated as a 
standard Heckman selection model, and testing the exogeneity of y3  in (1) and (2) is 
tantamount to conducting t-tests or a likelihood ratio test on the null hypothesis that τ1 = 0 
and τ2 = 0. 
A problem is that v  is not observed. But  ˆ v   can be generated as the residual after 
ordinary least squares is performed on (3). Inserting  ˆ v  in (7) and (8) in place of v then 
addresses this problem. 
In case the null hypothesis is rejected, the estimations have to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity due to the correlations between y3  and the error terms. Using limited-
information estimation strategies, one may address this problem as follows: Substitute y3 – 
π′z for v in (8) to obtain 
y2 = 1(θ′x + γ2y3 + τ2(y3 – π′z) + ϖ2 > 0).  (9) 
Then (9) and (3) can then be estimated jointly as an instrumental variable probit model 
with log-likelihood function given by 
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where φ(⋅) and Φ(⋅) are the standard normal density and distribution functions, respectively, 
and 
22
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22 ( ). v Ev σ≡  
In the same spirit, substitute y3 – π′z for v in (7) to obtain 9 
 
y1 = β′x + γ1y3 + τ1(y3 – π′z) + ϖ1 > 0     if y2 = 1.  (10) 
Then (10) can be estimated by generating the inverse Mills’ ratio from the instrumental 
variable probit estimates of (9), adding it to the regressor set of (10), and estimating the 
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where λ is the inverse Mills’ ratio, 
12
2
u uv v v ϖϖ ε ε σ =σ −σ σ σ  is the covariance between the 
error terms ϖ1 and ϖ2, ( ) ( )
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3.  Data Set and Variables 
Our data set is drawn primarily from the public use data files of the 2003 FIES and SOF. 
Both surveys are regular undertakings of the Philippine government’s National Statistics 
Office (NSO). The FIES is a triennial, nationally- and regionally-representative survey that is 
intended to track income distribution, costs of living and spending patterns, and the 
thresholds and head counts of poverty. The SOF is an annual, nationally-representative 
survey that is implemented as a rider to the third quarter Labor Force Survey (LFS). It is 
triggered when an informant/interviewee reports that a member of the respondent household 
went abroad during the past five years. Questions are then asked about that member, 
including the purpose of her trip, the country where she is based, her socioeconomic 
characteristics, the amounts of transfers in cash and kind that she has remitted during the 
preceding six months, and the modes of remittance. 
Both surveys implement the multi-stage sampling design of NSO’s Integrated Survey of 
Households (ISH). Redesigned in 2003, the ISH uses the 17 administrative regions of the 
country as its primary strata.
7  Each region is then further stratified by province, highly-
urbanized city (HUC), or independent-city component (ICC). In each stratum, barangays
8 
                                                             
7 In contrast, the sampling designs of earlier household surveys, including those of the 2000 FIES and 
SOF, used major cities and the urban and rural areas of provinces as the strata. 
8 Refers to village, which is officially the smallest political unit in the country. 10 
 
constitute the primary sampling units (PSUs). Enumeration areas (EAs) are drawn from 
these barangays, and households are in turn sampled from these EAs.
9  
The 2003 FIES sample consists of 42,094 households, while the 2003 SOF sample 
includes 2,888 overseas workers. Although the surveys are implemented at different times—
FIES interviews are conducted twice, in June of an FIES year and in January the year after, 
while SOF interviews are carried out in October of every year—in an FIES year, the samples 
of the FIES and LFS (on which the SOF is based) are identical.
10 It is thus possible to match 
the overseas worker with her origin household.  
As may be expected, data on worker-related variables are taken from the SOF, while 
those pertaining to the origin household come from the FIES. Data on remittances, however, 
are available in both surveys. After due consideration, in contrast to Rodriguez (1996), we 
decided to use remittance data from the FIES rather than the SOF. The problem with the 
remittance variables in the SOF is that they are based on a six-month reference period prior 
to the survey. Since the reference period of FIES variables is the entire year, SOF 
remittance data are likely to be understated relative to the FIES income variables.  
The FIES remittance variable, however, is not without its own shortcomings. First, 
although the survey questionnaire includes a specific question on remittance transfers, what 
is reported in the public use data file is a lumped category on international receipts that 
includes royalties and sales of assets. Fortuitously, international transfers other than 
remittances are not likely to be common occurrences among Filipino households. We thus 
deemed it reasonable to suppose that, among households with members who are overseas 
workers, transfer receipts can come only from those members.
11 A second problem is that, 
in households with multiple overseas workers, it is not possible to tag how much of total 
remittance receipts were sent by whom. Consequently, 625 observations had to be dropped 
from the data set. 
Our regression sample consists of 1,669 observations. The drop off from the original 
SOF sample size of 2,888 may be accounted for as follows: In addition to the multiple worker 
                                                             
9 The 2003 Master Sample brochure of the NSO is available online at www.census.gov.ph.  
10 LFS is a quarterly survey that normally has a rotating sample in which a respondent household 
remains part of the surveys for three consecutive quarters before being replaced. In an FIES year, 
however, the sample of the LFS is fixed for four quarters. 
11  A household with transfer receipts but which cannot be matched with an overseas worker is 
dropped from the sample. 11 
 
households, 214 observations had missing data and 380 households reported having zero 
labor income.
12 These were also deleted.  
Turning to our supplementary data sources, recall from the discussion in the previous 
section that identifying instrumental variables are needed to address the potential 
endogeneity of household labor income. Taking our cue from Paxson (1992) and Yang and 
Choi (2007), who use the variability of rainfall to estimate the variability of household 
incomes, we conjecture that weather disturbances are exogenous shocks to household labor 
incomes. In addition, we hypothesize that, being an indicator of local economic activity, the 
provincial employment rate exerts a positive exogenous effect on the same. The idea behind 
our choice of these two variables is as follows: Observed household labor income may be an 
endogenous variable in the remittance equations because it reflects the combined effects of 
opportunity costs (as suggested by the exchange motive), moral hazard (as indicated by the 
insurance and investment hypothesis), and sheer luck. To the extent that (good) weather 
conditions and economic activity are correlated with opportunity costs and the effectiveness 
of effort in generating income, however, conditioning labor income on them (along with the 
other explanatory variables) allows the effects of opportunity costs and effort to be 
distinguished from sheer luck. 
To make the weather disturbances variable operative, we obtained data on tropical 
cyclones and the provinces affected from the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and 
Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), the government’s weather agency. We 
then counted the number of typhoons, storms, and depressions that hit each province and 
tagged the values to the sample households by their location of residence. Provincial 
employment rate was more readily derived from LFS data and was similarly attached to the 
household data. 
Our dependent variables are the probability of remittance incidence and remittance 
amounts from the overseas worker in 2003. Incidence is set equal to 1 if the household is 
observed to have received transfers from abroad, and is zero otherwise. Remittance 
amounts are assumed to be personal transfers from the overseas worker and not due to 
pensions, contributions, sale of assets, or investment dividends. They are expressed in 
nominal Philippine peso values.  
We now turn to the explanatory variables and discuss our hypotheses on them. 
                                                             
12 We considered these households as essentially constituting a different sample: Not only are they 
totally dependent on remittances for subsistence, but they are also insulated from domestic income 
shocks. Being in a corner solution, their behavior would be motivated by a different set of factors 
compared to the other households. Unfortunately, their numbers may be too small for a separate 
investigation. 12 
 
The worker’s relation to the household head is intended to be a rough correlate of 
remittance motives. Workers who are household heads or spouses of household heads tend 
to be the primary breadwinners of families and so may bear the greater burden of providing 
for the family’s subsistence  (i.e., they may be impelled by the altruistic and exchange 
motives). In contrast, workers who are sons or daughters may be driven by a wider variety of 
motives.
13 On the other hand, as Lucas and Stark (1985) suppose as the complement or 
absence of the investment motive, workers who are in-laws may be less motivated to remit 
because their schooling costs are not likely to have been financed by the origin households. 
In the context of the Filipino extended family, however, the twist is that workers who are not 
closely related to the household head may nevertheless owe their education to the recipient 
households, so that their remittance behavior may be explained by the investment motive.
14   
The worker’s gender may reflect either an income effect or an altruistic concern for the 
household. In the first case, it may be that gender wage differentials exist in the worker’s 
host country. In the second case, the competing explanations are that a male household 
member is expected to be a better provider, but a female member is thought to be more 
attached to the origin household. 
The worker’s marital status is regarded as another indicator of the worker’s attachment 
to the household: Married workers are hypothesized to be more attached.  
The worker’s age, educational attainment, work experience, and occupation are proxy 
measures of her income. Controlling for the other income determinants, age may account for 
the income effect of work experience in the Philippines. Age may reflect the significance of 
retirement as well. The older the worker and the closer she is to retirement age, the more 
services she may need to contract (e.g., to acquire and administer assets or to insure care 
during her retirement years) with the origin household. Analogously, the educational 
attainment variables may additionally reflect an investment-motive aspect in that if the effect 
of income is already fully captured by age, work experience, and occupational status, then 
residual variations in remittance incidence and amounts that are explained by (high) 
educational attainment may be repayments for past investments made by the origin 
household. 
Type of visa is intended to account for how secure the worker’s status is in the host 
country and therefore the size, variability, and duration of her income stream. As pointed out 
                                                             
13 Relationship to the household head may also be an indication of relative bargaining powers. A 
household head or his spouse may have more bargaining power than a son or daughter, while an in-
law may have less.   
14 Because high schools and colleges are located in cities, it is customary for urban-based Filipino 
families to house rural-based relatives past their primary schooling years.  13 
 
in Menjivar et al. (1998), an immigrant visa may reflect a different motive as well: Instead of 
sending remittances, the migrant may want to save up to bring family members to the host 
country.
15  
Dummy variables on the living standard and geographic location of the host country are 
intended to control for differences in wages, cost of living, and the efficiency of remittance 
infrastructure.   
Household labor income comprises income from wages and salaries as well as profits 
from entrepreneurial activities. The hypotheses on this variable are as follows: Household 
labor income is negatively correlated with remittance incidence in the altruistic and insurance 
motives—in the latter because poor households are less able to finance insurance-motivated 
migrations. On the other hand, the correlation is lower among poor and rich households 
compared to middle-class households in the investment motive, because both poor and rich 
households have lower investment-motivated migrations. In relation to remittance amounts, 
household labor income is negatively correlated in the altruistic, insurance, and investment 
motives (because lower income is associated with negative income shock in the insurance 
motive and implies a greater burden for the worker to contribute in the investment motive), 
and either positively or negatively correlated in the exchange motive, depending on how 
consumption and services rendered are related in household preferences.  
Household asset income includes income from all sources other than compensation and 
entrepreneurial profit. It is supposed to take account of the inheritance motive. 
Gender of the household head is meant to account for the dependency of the household 
as well as the depth of the emotional bonds between the worker and the household. The 
conventional wisdom is that male-headed households are less dependent on the overseas 
worker, because male heads have more extensive networks. Whether for this reason or 
independently, it is also claimed that members of female-headed households are more 
closely knit. In addition, it may be generally the case that, in Filipino families, the emotional 
bonds of sons and daughters have with the mother are stronger than those with the father. 
Age in years of the household head is a measure of how established the household is. 
Like asset income, it is also supposed to account for the inheritance motive, since the older 
the household head is, the sooner bequests are likely to be made. 
Household age composition variables control for household size as well as the 
dependency burden. For a given number of household members in the 25 years and older 
group, the more members are in the 14 years and younger or the 15 to 24 year-old group, 
                                                             
15  In our taxonomic scheme, this may be classified under the investment motive, except that 
resources are saved to cover future migration costs instead of remitted to the origin household. 14 
 
the heavier is the burden on each adult in the oldest age group. In addition, the numbers of 
household members in each age group may be correlates of the exchange motive. A 
common practice among Filipino families is for a young child to be informally adopted by an 
unmarried or widowed aunt or uncle or by an older sibling  in the sense that  the  extra-
ordinary needs of the child are borne by the secondary parent. In the case of the unmarried 
aunt or uncle, the burden is usually assumed in exchange for an implicit promise that the 
child will take care of her or him in old age; in the case of older siblings, the obligation is 
usually in payment for investments made by the parents in the human capital of the older 
child.
16 For the oldest age group, the exchange contract may be in terms of taking care of 
the migrant worker’s assets and properties and other concerns. 
Dummy variables on the location of residence of the origin household are intended to 
account for location-specific effects, such as differences in environmental conditions, in 
general, and differences in remittance infrastructures and costs of living, in particular. 
Compared to the National Capital Region (NCR), CALABARZON, MIMAROPA,
17  and 
Central Luzon, for instance, other parts of the country may be less progressive, developed, 
or integrated with the market economy. Moreover, it may be more difficult and costly to send 
remittances to Mindanao Island, at the southern part of the Philippine archipelago. But costs 
of living may be lower in Mindanao and the rest of Luzon, so that the purchasing power 
parity of a U.S. dollar may be worth more.  
Additionally, a separate hypothesis applies to Mindanao, certain areas of which have 
suffered intermittently from terrorist attacks as well as skirmishes between the military and 
Muslim insurgents. Given the variability in income that such an environment implies, the 
insurance motive predicts more out-migrations and remittance inflows than in other places in 
the country.  
                                                             
16 In terms of our taxonomic scheme, it can be argued that both cases fall under the exchange motive, 
since transfers are made for the upkeep of the child. Note, however, that, in the case of the aunt or 
uncle, two implicit contracts are operative: one between the aunt or uncle and the child’s parents, 
which is the exchange motive, and another between the aunt or uncle and the child for future care. 
The requirement of the first contract is that the financial support must redound to the benefit of the 
child, since the aunt’s or uncle’s fate in old age is tied to the child’s socioeconomic status in 
adulthood. For this reason, these remittances are usually earmarked for verifiable expenditures that 
enhance socioeconomic success, such as school tuition and textbooks. The terms of the second 
contract, however, are nebulous, because they are fraught with uncertainty. Consequently, the aunt or 
uncle tries to become a secondary parent, showering the child with gifts to strengthen emotional 
bonds and deepen debts of gratitude. In the case of the older sibling, it may be said that remittances 
are due to the investment motive as well, with the care of a younger sibling simply being used by the 
parents as the ostensible reason for an older child to repay the investments made in him or her. 
17 In 2002, the old Southern Tagalog Region of Luzon Island was divided into two: CALABARZON 
and MIMAROPA. CALABARZON includes Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon provinces, 
while MIMAROPA consists of Occidental and Oriental Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, and Palawan. 15 
 
A final issue concerns the sampling distribution of our regression sample. Recall that the 
data collection procedures of the FIES and SOF are not based on a simple random sampling 
scheme. Unfortunately, because of the small size of the SOF sample, far too many PSUs 
had only one observation, which precluded the implementation of design-consistent 
estimation procedures. To address this problem, we report bootstrap standard errors of 
estimates of the sample means and structural equation parameters in addition to the more 
customary standard errors. The bootstrap estimates assume that our data are independently 
and identically distributed (which we believe is reasonable enough), but come from an 
unknown distribution.   
Descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in tables 2a, 2b, and 2c.  For the entire 
sample, households receiving remittances, on the average, are those with overseas workers 
who are household heads or spouses of heads, female, married, better educated with longer 
work experience abroad and working as unskilled workers  on a working visa in a  high-
income country in the Middle East or East Asia. These households are male-headed whose 
mean age is 50 years old and mostly reside in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and 
Central Luzon and with an average of one young household member aged 14 and younger, 
one household member aged between 15 years and 24 years old and two adult members 
aged 25 and older. Using a test of differences in means, overseas workers who are 
household head differs with workers who are neither household head nor spouse of heads in 
terms of: the sub-sample of household heads and head’s spouses are on average male, 
married, older with mean age of 40 years old, less educated, more experienced working 
abroad, unskilled working in upper-middle income country in the Middle East whose origin 
household has lower income, younger male household head, with higher young dependent 
household members, and residing in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon. 
4.  Empirical Findings 
Since remittance motives may roughly correspond to the stations that overseas workers 
occupy in their origin households, we present results for three groups of worker-household 
pairs: the entire sample, the subsample consisting of overseas workers who are either heads 
or spouses of heads, and the subsample of overseas workers who are neither heads nor 
spouses of heads. Our reasoning behind this strategy is that heads and heads’ spouses are 
more likely to be motivated only by altruistic and exchange considerations. Moreover, their 
altruistic concerns are likely to dominate, which leaves them with low bargaining power 
relative to the household. In contrast, the remittance behavior of workers who are neither 
heads nor heads’ spouses is  apt  to be explained by the insurance, investment, and 
inheritance motives as well. As secondary breadwinners, they may also be more strategic in 16 
 
their remittance behavior, e.g., in how their transfers advance their interests in the 
household. 
To  avoid having to make long-winded references to our samples, in the subsequent 
discussion we refer to  the entire sample as the first sample, the sample consisting of 
overseas workers who are either heads or spouses of heads as the second sample, and the 
sample consisting of overseas workers who are neither heads nor spouses of heads as the 
third sample. 
Is household labor income endogenous (in the remittance selection and amounts 
equations)?   
Recall from section  2 that the structural model that is to be estimated depends on 
whether or not household labor income is an endogenous explanatory variable in the 
remittance  selection  and amounts equations. As emphasized in Wooldridge (2002), to 
establish endogeneity, it is not enough to simply show that the predicted residual  ˆ v   is 
statistically significant in (7) and (8). More importantly, it must be demonstrated that the key 
identification condition of instrumental variables (IV) estimation is satisfied, which requires 
that in (3) the instruments z1 do capture residual variations in household labor income even 
after the influences of the other explanatory variables in the structural model are accounted 
for. 
Table 3 presents the crucial parts of our endogeneity tests, which are excerpted from the 
full results given in Appendix tables 1a, 1b, and 1c. The second column of table 3 shows the 
coefficient estimates of tropical cyclone occurrences in the locality and the provincial 
employment rate, our identifying instrumental variables. The third and fifth columns give the 
coefficient estimates of the predicted residual in the remittance selection equation (8), while 
the fourth and sixth columns show the coefficient estimates of the same residual in the 
remittance amount equation (7). The difference between columns 3 and 4, on the one hand, 
and columns 5 and 6, on the other, is that the numbers reported in the former are obtained 
by Heckman’s two-step procedure, while those in the latter are derived by maximum 
likelihood. 
Looking first at column 2, notice that the estimated coefficient of weather disturbances is 
negative and significant in all three samples, while that of the provincial employment rate is 
negative but clearly significant only in the first sample. That at least one of the identifying 
instrumental variables is found to explain the residual variation in the (log of) household 
labor income means that the key identifying condition of (IV) estimation is satisfied. 17 
 
The negative coefficient of tropical cyclone occurrences is as may be expected, but a 
question may be raised about whether a negatively-signed employment rate coefficient is 
reasonable. Given that (3) is a linear projection or a reduced-form specification, caution must 
be taken in interpreting and making too much of the results. This said, we argue that a 
negative partial correlation is plausible. After all, the correlation between the provincial mean 
of household labor incomes (calculated from the FIES) and provincial employment rates 
(from the LFS) is also negative (–0.1818). Why this is so, however, remains to be explored. 
A plausible story is that, because of the promise of continuous employment that they offer, 
progressive or rapidly urbanizing areas may be acting as magnets of domestic in-migration, 
thus making labor markets in these areas more competitive and wage rates low or 
downward flexible. In contrast, rural and more traditional locales may have institutional 
rigidities that keep employment rates relatively lower and expected household labor income 
somewhat higher, though more variable and seasonal.
18 
Turning to columns 3 and 5 as well as columns 4 and 7, observe that the coefficient 
estimates of the predicted residual of (3) are not statistically significant in both the remittance 
selection and the remittance amount equations—for the first and second samples. However, 
these asymptotic z-statistics only individually test the simple null hypothesis that one or the 
other coefficient of the predicted error is not different from zero. For completeness, we also 
perform a likelihood ratio test on the composite null hypothesis that the two coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. The LR statistic turns out to be 1.043 for the first sample and 0.7636 for 
the second sample. Thus, in both cases the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at level of 
significance α ≤ 0.1, and we conclude that household labor income is exogenous in both 
remittance equations, which implies that the structural model consists of (1) and (2),  a 
standard Heckman selection model. 
In the third sample, however, note that the predicted residual term of the labor income 
equation is found to be statistically significant in the remittance selection  equation as 
estimated by Heckman’s two-step procedure and in the remittance amounts equation as 
estimated by maximum likelihood. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test statistic on the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the predicted error are not different from zero in the two 
equations turns out to be 5.358. This rejects the null hypothesis at level of significance α = 
0.1, which implies that household labor income is an endogenous explanatory variable.  
                                                             
18 This argument is consistent with the domestic-migration hypothesis of Fabella (undated), which 
extends the Harris-Todaro model of rural-to-urban migration and provides indirect evidence that the 
pattern of internal migration in the Philippines reflects the migrants’ preference for low but steady 
urban wage income over a higher level of expected income in rural areas but which has a larger 
variance. 18 
 
What accounts for the difference in the findings on household income? We surmise that, 
because heads and heads’ spouses tend to be the primary breadwinners in their origin 
households (and may be more altruistic toward the household), they have lower bargaining 
power, so that the household’s opportunity cost counts for less in the exchange motive. 
Moreover, they may not care very much about whether household income is tainted with 
moral hazard  due to unobserved effort. Indeed, for overseas workers who are heads or 
spouses of heads, household income may not be significant in the remittance selection and 
amounts equations—to the extent that altruism is the dominant motive. In contrast, overseas 
workers who are neither heads nor spouses of heads (and who may be dealing not so much 
with parents but with siblings, in-laws, and nephews and nieces) may be more sensitive 
about the omitted variable effect of luck in the correlation between household income and 
opportunity cost. Furthermore, they may have more qualms about the extent to which 
household income is influenced by the unobserved effort of household members.  
In any case, to deal with the endogeneity of household labor income in the remittance 
selection equation, we apply the instrumental variable probit procedure on (9). To address 
the same problem in the remittance amount equation, we estimate the parameters of the log-
likelihood function given in (11).  
What factors affect remittance incidence? 
Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c report the parameter estimates of the structural model for the first, 
second, and third samples, respectively. Since household income is found to be exogenous 
in the first two samples, the estimates reported in tables 4a and 4b are based on (1) and (2) 
and estimated by Heckman’s two-step procedure and maximum likelihood. In contrast, since 
household income is found to be endogenous in the third sample, the estimates reported in 
table  4c are based on (9) and (10), with, as mentioned above,  (9) estimated as an 
instrumental variable probit model and (10) estimated by maximum likelihood using the log-
likelihood function (11) as the objective function. 
What is readily observed from the tables  is that, in each sample, the probability of 
remittance incidence and the natural logarithm of remittance amounts are explained by 
different sets of factors (which validate our strategy not to specify the structural equations as 
a Tobit model). Thus, in what follows, we discuss the results of each equation in turn. 
Who in the given pool of migrant workers remit and which households receive these 
remittances?  Our results indicate that the personal attribute variables  (of the overseas 
worker) that exert a significant influence are being married in the second sample and being 19 
 
male  in the third sample. Relative to the base profiles
19  against  which  the  results  are 
compared, being married increases the likelihood of remittances in the first sample by 3.8 
percentage points, while being male decreases it in the second sample by 9.7 percentage 
points.
20  In the second  sample, being married may indicate either closer ties to the 
household or lower bargaining power for the overseas worker since, whatever may be the 
agreed upon terms of the implicit exchange contract, her spouse or dependents may be able 
to exercise moral suasion over her. In the third sample, being male may reflect a lower 
attachment to the household, since (with the exception of those who already are household 
heads and who thus are not in this sample), unmarried men are expected to eventually form 
their own households. 
Among the (highest) educational attainment variables, only attended high school is found 
to be statistically significant in the first and second samples, whereas only being a grade 
school graduate is found to be statistically insignificant in the third sample. Why, compared 
to being a college graduate,  attending but not graduating from high school is the only 
educational attainment variable that exerts a negative and significant effect in the first and 
second samples and why being a grade school graduate is the only educational attainment 
variable that does not exert a statistically different effect in the third sample are difficult to 
explain. Easier to justify are the converse results that the educational attainment variables 
generally are not significant in the first two samples and are significant in the third sample: 
Remittance incidence may be less correlated with the overseas worker’s income or earning 
potential (which is proxied by the educational attainment variables) the more the household’s 
subsistence depends on the worker’s remittances. In other words, the  likelihood  of 
remittances may have less to do with the worker’s income and more to do with the recipient 
household’s needs when the overseas worker is the primary breadwinner. Conversely, 
remittance incidence may have more to do with the worker’s income and less to do with the 
recipient household’s subsistence needs when the overseas worker is a secondary 
breadwinner (possibly because of the investment and inheritance motives).  
                                                             
19 These base profiles are as follows: In the first and second samples, the overseas worker is a 40-
year old wife of a 50-year old household head. A college graduate who last left the country 30 months 
prior to the SOF survey and who also has 30 months of work experience abroad, she is in a high-
income country in the Asia and Pacific region, categorized as an unskilled worker. Located in the 
environs of the National Capital Region, her origin household earns P80,000 a year in labor income 
and P3,000 in asset income, has a household member younger than 15 years, another between 15 
and 24 years old, and two members who are older. In the third sample, the only difference is that the 
overseas worker is a 40-year old daughter-in-law. 
20 We calculate the marginal effects of a dummy variable as Φ(b + bx
0) – Φ(bx
0), where Φ(⋅) is the 
standard normal distribution function, b is the coefficient estimate of the dummy variable, b is the 
vector of coefficient estimates, and x




Note  that this explains  as well  why the coefficients of the educational attainment 
variables in the first two samples do not have the generally declining pattern that they show 
in the third sample: Being primary breadwinners, heads and heads’ spouses are expected to 
remit  on a regular basis; being secondary breadwinners, other overseas workers are 
expected to remit on the basis of their income, which is proxied by the education variables. 
On the marginal effects of education on the likelihood of remittances for the third sample, 
compared to the base profile in general and being a college graduate in particular, these turn 
out to be 48.1 percentage points lower when the worker has only attended grade school, 
28.7 percentage points lower  when she has only attended high school, 19.3 percentage 
points lower when she has a high school diploma, 20.7 percentage points lower when she 
has only attended a post-secondary (vocational) program,
21  and 12.8 percentage points 
lower when she has only attended college. 
A second proxy variable of the worker’s income or earning potential, work experience 
abroad turns out to be significant only in the first sample and then only with Heckman’s two-
step procedure. Its marginal effect on the likelihood of remittances is measured to be small—
about half a percentage point per month. It may be that work experience reflects residual 
variations in the probability of remittances that are due to income variations that are not 
captured by the educational attainment variables—an effect that is more relevant for the third 
sample. But it is not found to be statistically significant in the third sample, perhaps because 
of the small  sample  size, which causes the coefficient estimates to be measured less 
precisely. 
Like work experience, the number of months since the worker last left the country, which 
is a measure of her (waning) attachment to the recipient household, is found to be significant 
only in the first sample. Again, this may be because the variable is really germane for the 
third sample, but the size of that sample is too small for the effect to be measured precisely 
there. In other words, the variable may be less applicable to overseas workers in the second 
sample, whose attachment to the origin household can be expected not to weaken (or not to 
weaken as fast). Unlike work experience, this emotional attachment variable is indicated to 
exert a quadratic marginal effect on remittance probability that increases at a decreasing 
rate. At 30 months, its marginal effect on the likelihood of remitting is calculated to be about 
0.7 percentage points. 
                                                             
21 The larger marginal effect (in absolute terms) of post-secondary school attendance relative to that 
of a high school diploma may be due to a small number of workers who report attending in a post-
secondary school program as their highest attainment. Note that the standard error of the coefficient 
estimate of post-secondary school attendance is larger than that of being a high school graduate, 
which implies that the former coefficient is estimated less precisely. 21 
 
Yet another result that is found only for the first sample is that, when the worker has a 
nonworking and non-immigrant visa, she is 22.5 to 23.5 percentage points less likely to remit 
compared to the base profile. This may be due to the worker’s poor income or earning 
potential because of her less stable status or to the higher cost of remitting, for instance 
because doing so using formal channels requires divulging personal information that the 
worker would rather keep secret. 
The sets of dummy variables on the worker’s occupation in the host country and the 
classification of the host country in terms of per capita income and geographic location do 
not show robust results across the three samples. The sense the results provide is that there 
are too many categories for the sample sizes. But then, with Filipino overseas workers being 
deployed everywhere in the world and practicing so many occupations, it is difficult to find 
the classification schemes for occupations and host countries that strike the right balance 
with the sample size. 
Turning to the recipient household variables, notice that household labor income is found 
to be negative and significant in the first and third samples but not in the second. These 
results are consistent with our earlier interpretation of the outcomes on the endogeneity of 
this variable. Only the remittance incidence of overseas workers who are the secondary 
breadwinners of their origin households reacts to household labor income, because only for 
these workers is the labor income of the recipient household a strategic variable  of 
remittance behavior. As for the negative sign of household labor income, this is consistent 
with the altruistic and insurance motives. Compared to the base profile, a ten thousand peso 
increase in household  labor income is  calculated to reduce the likelihood of receiving 
remittances by about 0.5  and  3.0  percentage points  in the first and third samples, 
respectively. 
Intended to negatively account for the dependency of the household or the sense of 
closeness of household members, male headship is supposed to be more relevant for the 
third sample. Instead, it is found to be negative and significant only in the first two samples, 
reducing the likelihood of observing remittances by 7.6 to 8.2 percentage points in the first 
sample and 13.1 to 13.3 percentage points in the second sample (compared to the base 
profiles). Hence, it cannot be inferred  that, among secondary breadwinners,  remittance 
incidence is higher in female-headed households. But why would remittance incidence be 
higher for female-headed households when the overseas worker is either the head or the 
spouse of the head?  This may be because male headship is highly correlated with the 
existence of a spouse or partner who is also a primary breadwinner in the origin household 
and who shares the household’s dependency burden.  In contrast, a female-headed 22 
 
household may be associated with an unmarried head, on whom the household is more 
dependent for its subsistence.   
On the age composition of household members, it turns out that only the number of 
household members who are between 15 and 24 years old is statistically significant in the 
first sample and then only with Heckman’s two-step estimator, whereas only the number of 
household members younger than 15 years old is not statistically significant in the third 
sample. What these results may be suggesting is as follows: For overseas workers who are 
the primary breadwinners, the need for their remittances may be greatest when household 
members are between 15 and 24 years old, which is the age span during which a person 
graduates from high school, attends and graduates from college, and begins a fledgling 
career.
22 In contrast, for overseas workers who are secondary breadwinners, remittances 
may have to do more with payment for services rendered, insurance payoffs, returns to the 
household for investing in the worker’s relocation, and  the worker’s  investment in 
inheritance. Indeed, the exchange motive would be consistent with positive coefficients for 
household members who are between 15 and 24 years old and who are 25 years and older, 
while the other motives would be consistent with a positive coefficient for the latter group 
only. If so, the marginal effect of the older group of household members would be larger in 
the third sample, while that of the 15 to 24 year-old group would be larger in the first sample 
(which “averages” the effects over the two subsamples)—as in fact they are: Compared to 
the base profile, the likelihood of observing remittances in the first sample increases by 1.7 
percentage points when one more member between 15 and 24 years old is added to the 
household (while the other age groups do not have a marginal effect, since their coefficients 
are not statistically different from zero). In the third sample, the probability increases by 4.2 
percentage points when one more person is added to the 15 and 24 year-old age group, and 
by 9.0 percentage points when the person is 25 years or older. 
Finally, remittance incidence is reported to be affected by the geographic location of the 
recipient household only in the third sample. Again, the reason may be that only for 
secondary breadwinners do the monetary and non-monetary costs of remitting matter. By 
necessity, primary breadwinners have to work through the difficulties, since their recipient 
households are more dependent on their remittances. For the third sample, the marginal 
effects of being located in the Visayas and in Mindanao are calculated to be, respectively, 
20.7 and 27.4 percentage points lower than the base profile. 
                                                             
22  Note that this interpretation is consistent with the result that, for the second sample, only the 
coefficient of household members who are between 15 and 24 years old is positive in the probit 
model. Those of household members who are younger than 15 years or older than 24 years are 
negative. Again, small sample size may be the reason for the non-significance of the coefficient 
estimates.  23 
 
What factors affect remittance amounts? 
Before making sense of the estimation results, notice first that, in the third sample, none 
of the explanatory variables is estimated to have a statistically significant coefficient. This is 
because, having virtually the same set of explanatory variables, the reduced-form household 
labor income equation introduces collinearity problems that increase the standard errors of 
the coefficient estimates in the remittance amount equation. Hence, in the discussion that 
follows, we need only consider the coefficient estimates of the remittance amounts equations 
in the first and second samples. 
What are the determinants of (the natural logarithm of) remittance amounts? In the first 
sample, the personal attribute variables  (of the overseas worker)  that turn out to have 
statistically significant coefficient estimates are being an extended relative or even a non-
relation and being male. Compared to a son or daughter of the household head, a worker 
who is not a close relation remits 53 percent less, on average, to her recipient household. 
Compared to a female counterpart, a male worker sends 16 percent more. The negative 
effect of the former variable may be due to the worker’s being less attached to the 
household, while the positive effect of the latter variable may be due to the higher earning 
capacities of men or to gender wage differentials favoring men in the host countries of the 
overseas workers. 
In the case of the second sample, the attributes that are statistically significant are being 
male and married. Compared to female peers (who in this sample would tend to be spouses 
of heads), male workers (who would tend to be household heads) remit 23 percent more, 
which is a higher percentage than that of male workers in the first sample. Possibly, this is 
because male household heads tend to be the  primary breadwinners  in their recipient 
households. Compared to an unmarried household head, a married head or spouse remits 
between 62 and 71 percent more. This may be because having a partner left behind in the 
origin household lowers the effective bargaining power of the overseas worker. Alternatively, 
being married may be associated with greater attachment to the recipient household. 
Unlike in the remittance selection equation, the educational attainment variables are 
generally statistically significant in the first and second samples. Moreover, the extent of 
attainment is  more or less  positively related to amounts remitted. In the first sample, 
compared to a colleague who graduated from college, a worker who only attended grade 
school remits at least 58 percent less, one who only finished grade school 56 percent less, 
one who only attended high school 32 percent less, one who graduated from high school 31 
percent less, and one who did not graduate from college 20 percent less. In the second 
sample, the marginal effects are quite similar: 63 percent less for a worker who did not finish 24 
 
grade school, 67 percent less for one who did, 30 percent less for one who either only 
attended or graduated from high school, and 23 percent for one who only attended college. 
Thus, unlike remittance incidence, remittance amounts are highly (partially) correlated with 
educational attainment (or the worker’s income or earning potential). But the reason for lack 
of correlation of the overseas worker’s education with the first dependent variable and its 
high correlation with the second dependent variable may be the same: the great degree of 
dependence of the recipient household on remittances from its primary workers. Since the 
origin household cannot have invested in the education of its head or its head’s spouse 
(which invalidates the investment motive), the positive (partial) correlation of education with 
remittance amount may be attributed to the altruistic motive. 
Work experience abroad, another proxy variable of the worker’s income or earning 
potential, is estimated to exert a positive linear effect in the first sample and a quadratic 
effect in the second sample. Specifically, in the first sample, each month of work experience 
increases amounts remitted by one percent, while in the second sample, the marginal effect 
of work experience at 30 months is only 1.3 percent. This difference in the magnitudes of the 
marginal effects notwithstanding, the result remains that proxy variables of the worker’s 
income are positively correlated with remittance amounts, as predicted by the altruistic 
motive. Moreover, to the extent that education and work experience really measure the 
worker’s income, the results may also be consistent with the exchange motive, under the 
further assumption that heads and spouses of heads have low bargaining power relative to 
their households of origin. 
The  length of time since the worker last  left the country is estimated in the second 
sample to have a quadratic effect that peaks at around 49 months. In effect, after about four 
years, the attachment even of the head or the head’s spouse to the recipient household—as 
measured by the remittance amounts he or she sends—starts to wane. Nonetheless, the 
fact that  this  emotional-attachment  variable is found to have a statistically significant 
quadratic effect implies that the remittance behavior of  heads and heads’ spouses is 
consistent with the altruistic motive.  At 30 months, the marginal effect of this duration 
variable is to increase the remittances of a household head or a head’s spouse by 1.3 to 1.6 
percent. 
Type of work in the host country is reported to exert effects on amounts remitted that 
generally seem consistent with the expected earning power of the occupation. In the first 
sample, compared to unskilled workers, business managers tend to remit 58 percent more, 
professionals 31 percent more, technicians 40 percent more, service or sales workers 23 
percent more, tradesmen 16 percent more, and machine operators 24 percent more. In the 
second sample, compared to unskilled workers, managers remit at least 67 percent more 25 
 
and technicians 32 percent more, while remittances from service workers, tradesmen, and 
plant operators are 23 percent, 22 percent, and 29 percent higher, respectively. 
The host-country dummy variables exhibit rather surprising effects. In the first sample, 
workers in upper middle-income and other-income countries remit 17 percent and 57 percent 
more, respectively, compared to their peers in high-income countries. Relative to workers 
based in East Asia, South Asia, Australia, or Guam, those in Africa or Eastern or Central 
Europe remit 40 percent more, those in America or Western Europe remit 30 percent more, 
while those in the Middle East 24 percent less. In the second sample, relative to workers 
based in South or East Asia, those based in the Middle East remit 20 percent less, while 
those in America or Western Europe send back amounts that are 30 percent higher. These 
results may reflect the combined influences of the monetary and non-monetary costs of 
remitting, the availability of saving instruments or opportunities (and stability of financial 
markets), and “intercept” differences in incomes due to differences in host-country living 
standards.  
Similar to the results in remittance incidence, male headship in the recipient household is 
found to have a negative and statistically significant effect on remittance amount in the first 
and second samples. The marginal effect of the variable is estimated to be between –15.5 
percent and –16.8 percent in the first sample and –23.2 percent and –25.7 percent in the 
second. Again, the reason is possibly that, in samples where most overseas workers are 
either the head or the spouse of the head, female headship may be associated with an 
unmarried household head, so that the dependency burden of the overseas worker is 
heavier, hence the larger remittances. 
Of  the  age-composition-of-household-membership variables, only the number of 
members who are 25 years or older is found not to be statistically significant in the first two 
samples. In the first sample, each member who is 14 years or younger is estimated to 
increase remittances by 7.6 to 7.8 percent, whereas each member who is between 15 and 
24 years old is reported to do so by 6.6 to 6.7 percent. In the second sample, the marginal 
effects are 5.3 to 5.4 percent and 6.1 to 6.5 percent, respectively. It may thus be inferred that 
remittances are intended for the dependent members of the household. Notice, though, that 
the marginal effects of the 15 to 24 year-old group in the two samples are more or less 
equal, whereas, in the 14 years and younger group, the first sample is measured to have a 
higher marginal effect. This may be because the remittances of secondary breadwinners 
(i.e., older siblings, uncles, or aunts) may be directed more toward the younger household 
members (as described in footnote 16). 26 
 
Finally, on the geographic location of the recipient household, the results indicate the 
following: In the first sample, compared to residents of NCR and the contiguous regions of 
CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon, the remittance receipts of households in 
the rest of Luzon are 20 percent lower, while those of households in Mindanao  are 50 
percent lower. In the second sample, compared to the same base, households in Mindanao 
are estimated to receive 28 percent less. The lower receipts of households outside of NCR 
and its neighboring regions may reflect higher remittance costs. That remittances to 
Mindanao and the rest of Luzon are much lower when the sample of overseas workers 
includes secondary breadwinners is consistent with this reason: Driven by the altruistic 
motive, overseas workers who are primary breadwinners and on whose remittances the 
subsistence of their recipient households depends are less responsive to remittance costs 
than overseas workers who may just be supplementary income earners.    
What do the error covariances mean? 
The final interesting results concern the estimated error covariances of the structural 
models.  Note that in table  4c,  ρεv  is estimated to be positive (at 0.81) and  statistically 
significant. This means that, for the third sample, the error terms of the probit (remittance 
selection)  and the (endogenous) household labor income equations are highly positively 
correlated. In other words, unobserved factors that increase household income also increase 
the likelihood of remittance. What this result possibly implies is that remittance arrangements 
between the migrant worker and the recipient household are incentive-compatible, so that 
variables unobserved by researchers, such as the intensity of job search or of turning an 
additional buck, which potentially increase household labor income are rewarded with higher 
remittance incidence. 
Note, too, that, in table 4a, σεu and ρεu are both estimated to be negative (–0.74 and –
0.67, respectively) and statistically significant, and in table  4c,  σ1ϖ2  is estimated to be 
negative (–3.89) and significant as well. σεu  and  σ1ϖ2  are the covariances and ρεu  the 
correlation between the error terms of the probit (remittance selection) and remittance 
amounts equations. That they are negative in the first and third samples implies unobserved 
factors that increase the likelihood of remitting also decrease the natural logarithm of 
amounts remitted, so that in terms of (1) and (2), E(y1 | x, y3) > E(y1 | x, y3, y2 = 1), i.e., on 
average, the natural logarithm of amounts remitted in a random sample of overseas workers 
and their recipient households would be greater than in one where worker-household pairs 
are able to choose whether or not to be in the remitting sample. We conjecture that this 
result reflects Filipino giving practices, in which the social obligation is to give, but to do so in 
modest amounts. 27 
 
5.  Giving Norms 
The insight that remittances are set in the context of norms on giving has not been 
explored in the literature. But there have certainly been hints on it. In the inheritance motive, 
for instance, parents are thought to judge the remittance behaviors of sons and daughters 
against certain norms. Ultimately favored with bequests are those whose transfers exceed 
the norms. 
But why should remittances in general be circumscribed by norms on giving? As has 
been pointed out, remittances are not anonymous transfers,  behavior on which can be 
parsimoniously described by incomes, prices, or costs. Rather, they are manifestations of 
underlying and possibly multidimensional relationships between the overseas worker and the 
recipient household. Behavior then must be bound not only by market signals or even by 
participation- and incentive-compatible contractual rules implied by principal-agent models, 
but also by more general rules of the community on how to relate with others and particularly 
with members of the family. 
A problem in exploring norms (in remittance behavior), however, is that, since more or 
less everyone adheres to them, their effects are unlikely to be correlated with the observed 
characteristics of workers and households, and so will remain in the error terms. 
Consequently, only in estimates of error covariances of structural models are hints of their 
effects liable to be obtained—as we believe we have in this paper. 
Why do we think that the negative covariance or correlation of the error terms of our 
selection and amounts equations captures the influence on remittances of Filipino giving 
norms? There is the evidence on contemporary giving practices. Drawing on a survey on 
Filipino giving and volunteering behaviors conducted in 1999 to 2000, Fernan (2002) reports 
that, despite dismal economic conditions due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 86 percent of 
the respondent  households still claimed to have given to an organization during the 
reference period of the survey (i.e., the past 12 months prior to the interview) and 74 percent 
of them stated that they gave directly to persons in need—both of which compare favorably 
with  the U.S. giving incidence of 75 percent that Fernan cites from Hodgkinson and 
Weitzman (1996). Amounts given, however, were quite small. Average giving per household 
was P2,100 (US$41), P1,214 (US$24) of which were given directly to persons in need and 
P893 (US$18) of which were given to organizations. Relative to average household income, 
average giving per household amounted to only 1.8 percent. 
Similar behavior may also be gleaned from the 2003 FIES data. While 76.5 percent (12.6 
million of 16.5 million) of Filipino households claimed to have given gifts and contributions to 
others, the average proportion of these gifts and contributions to total consumption 28 
 
expenditure amounted to only 1.0 percent. Indeed, for the richest expenditure quintile, the 
average of this ratio was only 1.8 percent. 
Why do Filipinos give indiscriminately but in small amounts? We conjecture that these 
practices must be based on social norms, as defined in Fehr and Gachter (2000), which 
emerge from considerations of reciprocity. Peterson (1993) provides accounts of how poor 
Filipino families are able to cope and materially prosper by drawing on the resources of a 
wide network of blood and affinal relations. A distinctive aspect of the strategies that the 
family network uses  is that, when in need, a family is not necessarily assisted by clan 
members it has specifically helped in the past, but by those who have extra resources at that 
time—the objective of the assistance apparently being not so much to repay  past 
kindnesses, as to raise the average welfare of the clan. 
What conditions are conducive of such giving practices that eventually become norms? 
In appendix II, we provide a simple model that shows that, if the disaster probability is small 
and incomes during good times are not very much bigger than disaster incomes, a large 
network and small payoffs characterize the viable insurance scheme.  
6.  Concluding Remarks 
The literature on remittances has thus far focused on motives to explain behavior. As 
non-anonymous transfers, however, remittances are apt to be influenced by giving norms as 
well. To explore the correlates of remittance motives in terms of observed worker and 
household characteristics as well as the effect on remittances of giving norms, we formulate 
an empirical specification of remittance selection and amounts that takes account of the 
various motives involving worker-household pairs. Because household labor income is 
regarded as a potentially endogenous explanatory variable, we also develop a framework for 
testing this hypothesis and provide for alternative estimation strategies, depending on test 
outcomes. 
To address the possible heterogeneity of overseas workers with respect to remittance 
motives, we implement the hypothesis tests and the estimation of the empirical model on 
three groups of overseas workers and their recipient households: the entire sample, the 
subsample consisting of overseas workers who are either household heads or spouses of 
heads, and the subsample consisting of overseas workers who are neither heads nor 
spouses of heads. 
We find that household labor income is endogenous in the third, but not in the second 
sample. The non-endogeneity of income in the second sample may be because, as the 
primary breadwinners in their origin households (and possibly being more altruistic toward 29 
 
the household), heads and heads’ spouses have lower relative bargaining power, so that the 
household’s opportunity cost counts for less in the exchange motive. Moreover, heads and 
heads’ spouses may not care very much about whether household income is tainted with 
moral hazard due to unobserved effort. In contrast, the endogeneity of income in the third 
sample may indicate that overseas workers who tend not to be the primary breadwinners in 
their origin households may be more sensitive about the omitted variable effect of luck in the 
correlation between household income and opportunity costs. Moreover, they may be 
concerned about whether household income is tainted by moral hazard from the unobserved 
effort of household members. 
We also find that remittance incidence and amounts are explained by different factors. 
Moreover, in the second sample, altruism seems to dominate the exchange motive, perhaps 
because the household’s subsistence depends on the worker’s remittances to a greater 
degree. As a consequence, however, the overseas worker has low bargaining power and 
remittances are positively correlated with her income. This is evidenced by the following: 
First, very few explanatory variables are found to be statistically significant in the remittance 
selection equation. In other words, the likelihood of remittance is not systematically (partially) 
correlated with the explanatory variables, because almost all heads and heads’ spouses 
remit. Second, household labor income is not statistically significant in both the probit and 
remittance amounts equations, which indicates that heads and heads’ spouses do not 
predicate their remittance behavior on household labor income. Third,  what apparently 
matters more for heads and heads’ spouses are, on the one hand, the needs of the young 
household members, as reflected by the number of members 14 years and younger and the 
number of members between 15 and 24 years old—the  first of which is statistically 
significant in the remittance amount equation and the second of which is statistically 
significant in both equations, and, on the other, their capability to send remittances as 
reflected in proxy variables of income, such as education, work experience, and occupation. 
In contrast, the remittance behavior of the third sample seems more strategic. First, 
when overseas workers who are neither heads nor spouses of heads are included in the 
sample, household income is found to be negative and statistically significant, which is 
consistent with the altruistic and insurance motives.  Second, remittance incidence is 
correlated with educational attainment, which suggests that the frequency with which 
overseas workers who are neither heads nor spouses of heads are expected to remit 
depends on their ability to earn incomes. Third, the number of “adult” household members is 
found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of remittances, which may be interpreted 
as evidence of the exchange motive. Fourth, the likelihood of remittances is sensitive to cost, 
as reflected by the location of household residence variable. Fifth, the covariance of the error 30 
 
terms of the household income and probit equations is estimated to be positive and 
significant, which may be taken to imply that incentive-compatible mechanisms are in place 
that reward  efforts to increase household income with a higher likelihood of receiving 
remittances.  
Finally, we also find that the covariance of the error terms of the probit and remittance 
amounts equations is negative and statistically significant in the first and third samples. This 
implies that the remittance behavior of overseas workers who are neither heads nor spouses 
of heads is afflicted with negative selectivity. We interpret this result as reflecting the effect of 
giving norms, and we show evidence that it is consistent with Filipino charitable-giving 
practices. 
The policy implications of these findings are as follows: First, to the extent that altruism 
dominates the remittance behavior of heads and spouses of heads and altruism and the 
insurance motive explain the behavior of the other overseas workers, a negative shock to 
the Philippine economy will be met by larger remittance inflows. (The remittance effect of a 
worldwide economic slump, however, is another matter. In the altruistic motive, transfers will 
adjust to maintain the equality at the new (lower)  income levels of the ratio of marginal 
felicities to the ratio of reduced-form preference weights. In the exchange motive, transfers 
will depend on the effects of the income losses on relative bargaining powers and 
opportunity costs.) Second, overseas workers have different cost sensitivities. In particular, 
those who are not primary breadwinners have higher elasticities, so that remittance inflows 
can be expected to increase when the transaction costs of remitting become lower. Third, if 
remittance behavior is consistent with Filipino giving norms, then interventions should focus 
on increasing average remittance amounts (e.g., by imposing a minimum amount 
requirement or setting a declining tax rate or transaction fee on transfers). 49 
 
Appendix I  
Models of Remittance Motives 
In this section, we present five models of remittance motives that constitute the bases of our 
empirical specification in the main text. Drawn from the survey articles of Rapoport and 
Docquier (2007) and Alba (2008), we believe these models exhaust the  competing 
explanations of migrant worker-origin household transfers that can be explored with worker-
household data sets.
23 Our intent here is to reproduce the formal accounts of Rapoport and 
Docquier (2007)—not because theirs are the canonical versions, but to set precisely what in 
this paper we mean by each remittance motive and what behavioral implications can be 
drawn from these particular formulations.  
Our admittedly narrowly circumscribed research strategy is meant to address the following 
three problems: First, in the literature, (a) there is still no standard scheme for labeling the 
motives
24 and (b) each motive has several model variants. Second, writing a general model 
that is able to differentiate among the motives is a difficult if not virtually impossible task. 
Third, in coming to grips with the estimation issues, empirical researchers cannot simply rely 
on an enumeration of predictions from different formulations of a given motive, since such a 
listing provides no assurance that the implications are  mutually consistent; instead, they 
need internally consistent analytical models (such as the ones provided here, which can all 
be cast in terms of the principal-agent framework) as heuristic devices and springboards for 
their empirical model.  
Altruism 
The base motive against which the rival explanations of the other models are tested, the 
altruistic model posits that remittances are a manifestation of the concern that a migrant 
worker has for the recipient household. A simple account may be given as follows: Let i = 














i is the consumption of party i, V
i(⋅) is the felicity function over own consumption with 
V
i′ ≥ 0 and V
i″ ≤ 0, and β
i ∈ [0, 1/2] is the original preference weight that party i assigns to 
                                                             
23  We discard the strategic-motive model because transfers under the said motive are not between 
workers and origin households, but from migrant workers to individuals or organizations that keep low-
productivity workers from migrating and depressing wages in the host country.  
24 For instance, Lucas and Stark (1985) fuse as the self-interest motive what we label as the exchange, 
inheritance, and insurance motives, and de la Brière et al. (2002) call the investment hypothesis what we 
refer to as the inheritance motive.  50 
 
the other (implying that the other party can be neither despised, since β
i cannot be negative, 
nor preferred to the self since β
i cannot be greater than 1/2).
25 
Under full information, both parties are aware of how each regards the other as well as of the 
specific forms of the utility functions. Thus, the migrant worker in particular can factor in the 
origin household’s preferences when deciding how much of her income to consume and to 
remit to the household.
26 In the process, she derives a new expression for her utility function, 
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is a “reduced-form” preference weight that the worker assigns to the household, which 
factors in the importance, β
h, that the household accords to the worker. 
This reduced-form preference weight has interesting implications. First, when the worker 
does not care for the household, the weight is zero, as may be expected. Second, as both 
parties increasingly care for each (so that the original preference weights each approach 
1/2), the reduced-form weight approaches 1/3. Third, when the household does not care for 
the worker but the worker cares deeply for the household—a case of unrequited love—the 
reduced-form weight is 1/2. Thus, the specification yields the paradoxical result that the 
worker assigns a higher reduced-form preference weight to the household when it does not 
care for her than when it does. The reason for this is that the worker, aware that the 
household is pained when she demonstrates care for it (since this occurs at the cost of some 
self-sacrifice), takes account of this negative feedback effect. 
Given this set-up, the worker uses transfers so that the resulting consumption pair—hers 
and the household’s—maximizes the value of her utility function. Let C
m  =  I
m  –  T  and 
C
h = I
h +  T, where I
i  stands for the ith party’s pre-transfer income and T  is  the amount 
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and the necessary conditions for obtaining the optimum consumption pair are that  
                                                             
25 We assume that these preference weights are not correlated with the endowments of the parties, since 
this would possibly taint altruism with inheritance motives. 
26 We assume that transfers go only from the migrant worker to the household and not vice versa. Our 
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i.e., the ratio of marginal felicities  of the migrant and the recipient household is exactly 
matched by the ratio of the worker’s reduced-form preference weights for the household to 
that for herself. 
The altruistic model has the following hypotheses: Remittances are positively correlated with 
the migrant worker’s actual income, earning potential, and sense of closeness to the 
recipient household, but negatively correlated with the recipient household’s income. In 
addition, the model predicts that if the worker’s income increases by one currency unit and 
the household’s income decreases by the same amount, transfers would increase by one 
currency unit.  To see this,  totally differentiate  the necessary condition for maximization 
(assuming T > 0). This yields 
∂∂
− −γ − +γ + =
∂∂
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In turn, this prediction implies that transfers insulate consumption from income shocks, so 
that  consumption expenditures and (pre-transfer) incomes of  recipient households and 
migrant workers are statistically independent. 
Exchange 
To set this motive in stark contrast to the previous one, suppose now that the migrant worker 
and the remittance-receiving household are non-altruistic agents who are bound not 
necessarily by kinship ties but by a contractual arrangement. Thus, remittance transfers are 
not about the migrant worker’s concern for the welfare of the recipient household but 52 
 
payments for services rendered, which may be as varied as managing the migrant’s assets, 
handling her affairs, or taking care of her family.
27  
Two features of the contractual arrangement are noteworthy: First, the engagement is not 
simply an anonymous market transaction, but (as would be noted in the new institutional 
economics literature) is rather imbued with issues of mutual trust, credible commitments, and 
(second-party) enforcement mechanisms. More than the hiring of a financial manager, a 
personal lawyer, or a household caretaker is involved. Either no market at all exists for these 
services in the local economy so that special arrangements have to be made or the 
transaction costs of contracting such services are much lower than the available market 
alternatives.
28 Thus, in empirical validations of the exchange motive, incorporating specific 
institutional details that provide the backdrop for the contractual arrangements in a given 
community takes on heightened importance. Second, the contract must be Pareto-
improving, i.e., the arrangement must be mutually beneficial, which implies that the 
participation constraints are satisfied (i.e., both parties find the provisions of the contract 
acceptable). Operationally, this means that the transfer payment can neither be greater than 
the maximum amount that the migrant worker is willing to remit for the services contracted 
nor less than what the household can receive in an alternative activity. 
To account for the pay-for-services contract, write the utility functions of the migrant and the 
household as V
i(C
i,  X), where X  is the amount of services of a given quality that is 
contracted. For the migrant, it is posited that increases in each of these two factors are 
associated with a higher level of welfare:  
( ,)










     and     
( ,)











For the household, it is assumed that increases in consumption imply better well-being, but 
increases in services rendered are a disutility: 
                                                             
27  Migrant investments in the home country, which are mentioned in Lucas and Stark (1985) and 
explored in Osili (2007), may be classified under this motive in the sense that the origin household is 
tasked implicitly or explicitly to tend these investments.  
28 For instance, it may be well nigh impossible to specify, monitor, and enforce the quality and extent of 
services to be rendered under all possible contingencies, so that it is difficult to draw up a formal contract. 
In contrast, there may be long-standing norms that dictate the appropriate conduct and that prescribe 
how gains from the exchange may be divided between parties in a service arrangement given a particular 
set of circumstances. Or quid pro quo or bundled contractual arrangements may be involved to get 
around weak enforcement of property rights, such as when a caretaker household is allowed to live on 
the property of the migrant to secure it against encroachment by squatters. It may even be that the 
exchange contract is a specific application of the Coase Theorem, such as when the migration decision of 
parents with young children creates a negative spillover effect on the rest of the clan in the form of having 
to provide childcare services. 53 
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There is thus a divergence of interests between the two parties with respect to the second 
factor, and it is the pay-for-service contract that makes them compatible. 
Under full information and the assumption that bargaining power rests entirely with the 
migrant
29 (as is customary in principal-agent models), the optimal contract that the migrant 
offers the household on a take-it-or-leave-it basis sets the amount of the transfer payment to 
be such that the household is just indifferent between accepting the contract and rejecting it 
for the alternative activity. In other words, the contract sets the household at 
+− = ( , ) ( ,0) 0.
hh hh VI T X VI  In effect, the migrant sets the contractual terms to exact the least 
sacrifice from herself in terms of lower resources for consumption that the transfer amount 
represents, while at the same time ensuring that they satisfy the household’s participation 
constraint (that the benefit-cost ratio of accepting the contract is just the same as that of the 
alternative activity).
30  
Note that totally differentiating  ( , ) ( ,0) 0
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29 This assumption is adopted to simplify the analysis. Its effect is to change the results only marginally to 
account for the difference in the relative bargaining powers of the parties. 
30 The greater the bargaining power of the household, the more the contractual terms offered would favor 
its interests. When bargaining power lies entirely with the household, the migrant offers to remit the 
maximum amount of funds that she is willing to pay for the given services. This is the amount of transfers 
that just satisfies the migrant’s participation constraint, i.e., that just makes the migrant indifferent 
between contracting and not contracting the services,  +− =
max ( , ) ( ,0) 0.
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The first result implies that transfers increase with the diversity or range, quantity, intensity, 
and quality of services contracted. The second states that a unit increase in the recipient 
household’s pre-transfer income has  an ambiguous effect on remittances: If household 
consumption and the contracted services are independent in preferences, then 
⋅> + ⋅ ( ,) ( ,) , hh
hh hh
CC VI VIT  which implies that ∂T/∂I
h > 0, i.e., increases in pre-transfer income 
induce larger transfers due to the household’s higher opportunity costs. On the other hand, if 
household consumption and the contracted services are complements in preferences 
(perhaps because being the migrant’s agent lends prestige or opens more income-
generating opportunities), then it is possible that  <+ ( ,0) ( , ), hh
hh hh
CC VI VIT X so that ∂T/∂I
h < 0, 
i.e., increases in pre-transfer income may be associated with smaller transfers. 
In addition, the exchange model suggests that the maximum amount of transfers that the 
migrant is willing to pay increases with her income, although this amount tends to be 
different from the actual transfer that she offers, which depends on relative bargaining 
powers. 
Based on differences in their predictions, the following distinctions can thus be made 
between the altruistic and exchange models: First, (actual) transfers are unequivocally 
positively correlated with the migrant’s income in the first model, but are not necessarily so in 
the second model. This is because what covaries with migrant’s income in the exchange 
model is the maximum transfer amount. This latter variable, however, is observed in the data 
(as actual transfers) only when the household’s bargaining power is strong, which itself is 
difficult to ascertain. Thus, in general and particularly when households generally have poor 
bargaining power, observed transfers may not show any covariation with migrant’s income.   
Second, transfers are unambiguously negatively correlated with the household’s income in 
the altruistic model, whereas the covariation between the variables in the exchange model 
depends on how household consumption and services are related in the household’s 
preference function. If preferences over consumption and services are independent, then 
transfers are positively correlated with household income; if the two are complements, then 
transfers and household income may be negatively correlated.  
Third, the likelihood and amount of transfers are positively correlated in the altruistic model, 
but are not necessarily so in the exchange model. In the first model, when the migrant’s 
income rises or when the recipient household’s income falls, the likelihood of remitting 
increases (because of the migrant’s concern for the household). Thus, the probability of 
remitting and the amount remitted both move in the same direction as a result of changes in 
the circumstances of the migrant and the household. The same cannot be said in the second 
model. If the household’s opportunity costs rise and this prompts the migrant to increase 55 
 
transfer amounts, this change in circumstances need not increase the likelihood of 
remittances, which may be dictated by other factors (e.g., by contractually set dates on 
which the payments have to be received by the household).  
Fourth, changes in general economic and political conditions that affect the opportunity cost 
or bargaining power of the household change the amount of transfers in the exchange 
model, but do not have an impact in the altruistic model. If the unemployment rate rises in 
the country of origin, for instance, which in turn lowers the opportunity cost of the household 
and weakens its bargaining power, then transfer amounts should decrease under the 
exchange model. To the extent that this labor shock does not directly affect the consumption 
resources of the recipient household, however, it does not have an effect on transfers in the 
altruistic model.
31 
Insurance and moral hazard 
Unlike the first two models, the insurance model presents migration and remittances as 
interdependent behaviors arising from a single integrated decision-making framework. 
Drawing on the observation that incomes in less developed countries tend to be more 
volatile (and all the more so in rural and agricultural locales), the model maintains that 
migration is a coping mechanism adopted by families in such settings to insure themselves 
against geographic risk.
32 The insight is that, by strategically locating members in a variety of 
places such that their incomes end up being uncorrelated, these families in effect are able to 
spatially diversify their portfolios of labor resources, thus minimizing their overall exposure to 
an income shock in any one place. Remittances then represent intra-family insurance 
payoffs meant to counter the vicissitudes of fortune experienced by family members where 
they are and to smooth out their levels of consumption (or maintain their standards of living) 
over good times and bad.  
A simple account of the insurance model of remittances may be given as follows: Consider a 
two-period world (t = 0, 1) consisting of two individuals, m and h. Let per capita income in the 
home country be I
0 during the initial period, I in period 1 if times are bad, and Ī if good. (It is 
assumed that I < Ī.) As a simplifying convenience, suppose that m and h have identical, risk-
averse utility functions, the component felicity functions of which are additively separable 
over time periods and states of the world, so that expected utility is given by  
E[V(I
0, I, Ī)] = v(I
0) + pv(I) + (1 – p)v(Ī), 
where p is the probability of the bad state of the world. 
                                                             
31 This issue underscores the importance of exploring remittances using panel data sets, where changes in 
household incomes and in prevailing conditions can be sorted out. 
32 An early paper that points out the risk-dispersing feature of migration is Stark and Levhari (1982). 56 
 
Exploring her options, m discovers that migrant workers in a neighboring country earn I
m >> I 
with certainty. Unfortunately, migrating to that country costs c, where I
0 < c < 2I
0, so that it is 
more than she can afford. Moreover, there is neither an option to borrow against future 
income (i.e., m is liquidity constrained) nor a facility to avail of a loan (i.e., she is also credit 
constrained). m, however, can try to convince h to pool their first-period resources to enable 
her to migrate in return for a state-contingent share in her second-period income, so that 
both of them will each have a higher overall welfare, whatever h’s second-period outcome 
turns out to be. 
Formally, m’s offer can be described as follows: Let ω be m’s share of her migration cost, 
and T and T  be the transfers that m commits to provide h in the bad and good states of the 
world, respectively. m has a principal-agent problem of the form 
,, max ( ) s.t.  ( ) ,
m hh
TTEV EV V
ω ≥  
where V
h is h’s minimum level of utility that is guaranteed by the contract. The set of Pareto-
efficient insurance contracts for this problem consists of the triple 






where λ is the relative bargaining power of h. Using the expected utility function described 
above, we may rewrite this objective function as 
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In other words, maximization of the objective function requires that, in period 0 as well as in 
each of the two states of the world, the ratio of m’s marginal felicity to that of h must be equal 
to the bargaining power of h. 
As an illustration, suppose that λ = 2. Then the first equation of the first-order conditions 
implies that, at the last unit of net period-0 resources consumed, the marginal felicity of m 57 
 
must be twice that of h. Since m and h are risk averse, their marginal felicities decline as 
income rises. Consequently, m’s net period-0 resources must be less than  h’s.  But any 
difference in period-0 resources between m and h can only come from ω and (1 – ω). Hence, 
it must be that ω > (1 – ω) or ω > 1/2, i.e., m bears more than half of the cost of her migration 
if h’s bargaining power is twice hers. (A similar analysis can be carried out on each of the 
other two equations. If λ = 2, they yield the results that  ( )/2
m TI I >−  and  ( )/2.)
m TII >−  
There are two problems with the insurance arrangement, however. The first concerns the 
credibility of m’s promise to remit transfers, and the second has to do with the case in which 
h’s actions may have a bearing on his income in the second period.  
With regard to the first issue, the question may be raised: After obtaining her benefits from 
the deal, what is to keep m from reneging on her commitment to h? Without assets that can 
be used as collateral, which indeed is why m is unable to avail of a loan from formal sector 
sources to finance her migration in the first place, and absent any guarantor who can be 
made to bear the burden of such a loan,
33 the informal contract between m and h—at least 
when it is an anonymous transaction—suffers from a lack of second-party enforcement 
mechanisms (i.e., schemes by which h can compel m to honor her promise regarding the 
transfers).  
Such sanctions, though, are readily available within a family setting or a kinship group. If m 
and h are not merely bound by a business deal but are members of a kinship network, news 
that m failed to comply with the terms of the agreement may cause her to lose face, not only 
among immediate members of the family, but in the larger community as well. Worse, she 
may be ostracized by the family or disinherited by her forebears as a result. 
The upshot then is that the insurance motive is unable to stand on its own merits, but needs 
to be buttressed by other motives (e.g., altruism or inheritance) to be practicable.
34 But this 
“coupling” requirement, in turn, makes it difficult to verify the insurance model in empirical 
settings and to measure the extent to which it influences remittance behavior independently 
of other motives.  
Turning to the second issue, suppose that, instead of home-country income being 
exogenously determined by Nature, it depends to some extent on h’s effort. For instance, it 
may well be that, in the good state of the world, income is an increasing function of effort, 
but, in the bad state, effort has no effect on income. Assume that effort itself causes a 
                                                             
33 A page that can be taken from medieval bargaining practices, noted in North (1990), is that m can send 
a kin (whose closeness to her is indisputable) as a “hostage” in h’s household. The kin gains his freedom 
only after it is established that m has honored her end of the deal. 
34 de la Brière et al. (2002) tests the relative importance of the insurance and inheritance motives using 
panel data on migrants and origin households from the Dominican Sierra.  58 
 
disutility that increases at an increasing rate. Then, for as long as m can be counted on to 
deliver her end of the deal, h’s problem may be cast as finding the effort level that maximizes 
the value of his expected preference index over income. 
Formally, let h’s preferences over consumption and effort e be described by   
2 ( ,) ,
2
hh h VCe C e
β
= −  
where β > 0. Let  
with probability 1












hh CC <  
Then  h’s expected utility function may be expressed as expected consumption less his 
disutility of effort: 
22 2 [ ( , )] (1 ) ( ) .
22 2
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Suppose that h’s income I depends on effort only in the good state of the world, but is zero 
otherwise, so that 
with probability 1








where  α > 0 is the marginal product of effort, and transfers from m are triggered when 
income falls below a mutually agreed upon level, i.e., I  <  I
min. Then h’s expected utility 
function may be rewritten in terms of effort for a given level of minimum guaranteed income 
as 
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The first-order conditions of the problem are therefore given by 
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Moral hazard is precluded when, conditional on I
min, 
*
1 e  yields a higher value of the expected 
preference function than 
*
2, e  i.e., when 
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In contrast, under the moral hazard scenario, the conditions are:  
E(C
h) = E(T) = I




Some predictions that can be drawn from the insurance model are as follows: First, for as 
long as I
min is low enough so that moral hazard is precluded, just as in the altruistic model, 
remittance amounts increase with the migrant’s (pre-transfer) income and decrease as the 
origin household’s (pre-transfer) income increases. Moreover, as in the altruistic model, a 
one currency-unit increase in the migrant’s (pre-transfer) income and a one currency-unit 
decrease in the origin household’s (pre-transfer) income generates a one-currency unit 
increase in remittances. Second, emigration from and remittances to places with more 
volatile incomes are more likely. Third, in contrast to the altruistic model, amounts remitted 
are highly variable and the frequency of remittances is intermittent. Moreover, while it can be 
argued in the case of the altruistic model that, over time, remittances gradually decline in 
amount and regularity as the migrant’s emotional attachment with the origin family fades, in 
the insurance model, remittances come to an abrupt stop as soon as the migrant’s 
contractual obligations are fulfilled. Fourth, again unlike in the altruistic model, remittance 
incidence among poor households is likely to be low, since poor households are less able to 
afford the migration costs of their members. Thus, in the insurance model, migrants are 
more likely to come from wealthy households with risky asset portfolios.
35 Fifth, if informal 
insurance contracts do not preclude moral hazard, the proportion of adult members who are 
                                                             
35 Note a fine point on the implication for empirical testing: For a given household, it may well be that a 
decrease in income increases the amount remitted (as in the altruistic model)—a longitudinal effect. 
Across households, however, a lower income may mean lower remittance frequencies (because of a lower 
capacity to finance migrations)—a cross-section effect. This implies that panel data are needed to sort out 
these contrasting effects when empirically verifying the insurance model.  60 
 
not gainfully employed is likely to be higher among families with migrant members.
36 Sixth, 
the higher the burden of the migration cost the household agrees to bear relative to the value 
of its assets, the more likely it will engage in morally hazardous behavior. 
Investment 
As its name suggests, the investment model views migration as an opportunity for a family to 
increase its wealth. The idea is that a family may exploit spatial differences in wages by 
financing a member’s costs of migration (as well as other preparatory or complementary 
activities, such as education and job search, that enhance her employability and earning 
potential in the host country) and in recompense receive annuities in the form of remittance 
payments. 
As the investment model shares certain features with the insurance model, it is useful to 
point out the similarities as well as the fine distinctions between the two in order to 
appreciate each in starker relief. The most obvious similarity is that both are concerned with 
the spatial placements of family members. Unlike in the insurance model, however, the 
underlying reason for migrations in the investment model is not to minimize risk, but to take 
advantage of the wage differential between the origin and host countries. In effect, in the 
investment model, the family has no apprehensions about the geographic concentration of 
its members’ relocations. 
A second similarity is that the gamut of issues that beset the insurance model, e.g., the 
liquidity and credit constraints faced by the potential migrant (at least with respect to formal 
sector sources), the credibility of her commitment to remit payments once she has migrated, 
the personal (i.e., non-anonymous) nature of the contractual arrangement, and the norms, 
sanctions, and enforcement mechanisms that are in play in a family or kinship setting, attend 
the investment model as well. This has two implications: First, it serves as a reminder that, in 
studying the investment model (as well as the insurance model) in specific empirical 
settings, the researcher must pay particular attention to the institutional constraints—
especially the specific expressions or formulations of norms, sanctions, and enforcement 
mechanisms that lend the informal contract a non-anonymous character. Moreover, the 
researcher needs to be sensitive to the possibility that other motives such as altruism and 
inheritance may be operative as well, as supportive enforcement mechanisms. Second, 
there is no need to rehash these issues in the exposition that follows.   
                                                             
36 Note that this does not mean that a higher unemployment rate among families with migrant members 
per se implies that they are engaged in morally hazardous behavior. A higher unemployment rate is only a 
necessary—not a sufficient—condition for moral hazard to be present. In addition, effort in generating 
labor income needs to be accounted for.  61 
 
An account of the investment model may be given thus: Assume that the production function 
of the family enterprise in the origin country is given by α(ℓ – βℓ
2/2), where ℓ is the number of 
household members and α > 0 and 0 < β < 1 are parameters. Suppose that there are two 
periods, 0 and 1, and each person needs at least I
min  to survive in each period. The 
household considers migrating in period 1. Let c be the cost of migration per person. If all 
household members work in period 0, then the number of migrants that can be financed by 









where x is the floor function of (a generic) variable x. The liquidity constraint with respect to 
migration cost is binding if m
c < ℓ. This is more likely to happen the smaller is the value of α 
and the larger are the values of I
min and c. As for household size, its effect on m
c is less 
straightforward. In general, for  a  given configuration of the parameters  (including  ℓ), 
migration cost would tend to be a binding constraint the larger ℓ is. This is because, treating ℓ 
as a real number rather than an integer, the second derivative of the expression in the floor 
function with respect to ℓ is negative, which implies the following: If steps (i.e., the values of 
m
c) are rising (falling), the half close-half open interval [ℓ*, ℓ
*) over which a given value of m
c 
remains the same tends to be longer (shorter) the higher (lower) m
c is. 
On the other hand, the liquidity constraint does not bind if m
c ≥ ℓ. For households that are 
thus unconstrained, it is the profitability of migration that matters. Let I
m be the income of a 
migrant in a host country. Then the problem of liquidity-unconstrained households is to  
( ) ( )
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where m is the number of migrants. From the first-order conditions, the optimal number of 
migrants may be derived as 
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In other words, for liquidity unconstrained households, the number of members who are sent 
to migrate to maximize profits is (a) zero if a migrant’s income net of migration cost is less 
than the value of her marginal product in the family enterprise, (b) that level (0 < m
* < ℓ) 
where, for the last household member who migrates, the net marginal benefits of migration 
and of working in the family enterprise are just offsetting, and (c) the entire household if the 62 
 
net benefits of migration per person exceed the productivity  parameter  α  of the family 
enterprise. It can be readily inferred from this optimizing rule that m
* is higher the larger are 
I
m and ℓ and the smaller are α and c.  
The observed number of migrants thus depends on both the liquidity constraint and the 





o  <  ℓ, transfers will be observed. Assuming that total income is equally shared 
among household members, transfers will be the difference between mean household 
income and the origin-country income per household member left behind, i.e., 
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The interesting predictions of the investment model concerns the technical efficiency of the 
family enterprise in the origin country, which has opposing impacts on liquidity-constrained 
and profitability-motivated migrations. As may be noted, when the family enterprise is 
unproductive, what limits the number of migrants is the binding liquidity constraint. 
Accordingly, improvements in productivity relax this constraint and afford more migrations. In 
contrast, when the family enterprise is productive, the family’s consideration turns to whether 
or not a member’s relocation increases total family income. The more productive the family 
enterprise is, however, the less likely working elsewhere can do so. Thus, the investment 
model predicts that, as a proportion of family size, the fewest migrations will be observed 
among the poorest and richest families—the former because they cannot afford it, the latter 
because it is not sufficiently profitable.
37 
A related set of implications concerns differences in the distribution of factor payments or of 
wages between the host and origin countries. Specifically, the fewest migrations will be 
observed in those professions and occupations with the narrowest earnings differentials or 
with the least harmony in technical standards. Professionals and skilled workers in 
occupations that have common technical standards and rules and have the highest wage 
differentials have the greatest incentives to migrate. In contrast, workers whose talents, 
                                                             
37 An interesting implication for the Philippines that may be inferred from this prediction concerns the 
beneficiaries of agrarian reform, on the one hand, and the families whose landholdings were 
appropriated, on the other hand. Since greater asset holdings improve the income-generating capacity of 
the family enterprise, the liquidity constraint with respect to migration cost is relaxed for the 
beneficiaries. Since reduced asset holdings  worsen the income-generating capacity of the family 
enterprise, the profitability of migration is enhanced for the displaced landowners. Hence, if the 
investment model is correct, proportionately more family members of agrarian reform beneficiaries and 
of the displaced landowners can be expected to migrate than members of families taken at random. 63 
 
skills, and habits are less well adapted to the host-country environment do not find relocating 
as attractive. 
As for remittances, the implications of the investment model are that these disbursements 
will be (a) constant (i.e., will not diminish over time) and regular (i.e., not intermittent) to the 
extent that transfers represent payments for the migrant’s foregone contribution to the family 
enterprise or, what amounts to the same thing, her foregone contribution to family income, 
(b) larger the larger is the income of the migrant and the lower is the pre-transfer income of 
the household, and (c) increasing at a decreasing rate with respect to number of migrants 
(implying that the amount remitted by each migrant falls as the number of members who 
migrate increases). In addition, the model predicts that, on a per member basis, transfers will 
decrease at a decreasing rate as the household size increases. 
Finally, among all the remittance-motives models, the investment model is the only one that 
reminds that migration can be a long-term goal involving a series of preparatory activities 
and related decisions, such as choice of school, years of schooling and educational 
attainment, occupation, career, and work experience.
38 Indeed, the test proposed in Lucas 
and Stark (1985) for discerning an investment motive in remittances relies on this insight: 
Since the immediate family usually finances a person’s education, the coefficient of a son’s 
or daughter’s education in a remittance equation should be higher than that of an in-law’s 
education. Similarly, Hoddinott (1994) interprets the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of the migrant-son’s earnings in his remittance regressions as repayments for 
past parental investments in the sons’ education (reinforced by the prospect of bequests). 
An implication of the investment motive is that the marginal effects of preparatory activities 
on migration must be accounted for in calculations of the social and private costs and 
benefits of migration. Policies should then see to it that, at the last worker who emigrates 
due to the investment motive, the marginal social benefits of the decision chain (that may 
include schooling choices) just equal its marginal social cost. Obviously, this is easier said 
than done. Nonetheless, glaring examples ought to be curbed, such as the subsidized costs 
of medical education. 
Inheritance  
The inheritance model posits that remittances are a—if not the—criterion by which migrant 
sons and daughters are judged when parental bequests are formulated. Strategic behavior is 
assumed on both sides of the generational divide: Parents use bequests to reward good 
                                                             
38 Given the Philippines’ long record of emigrating workers, it may be interesting to explore to what 
extent choices on schooling, occupation, career, and work experience are or have been motivated by the 
desire to emigrate or work overseas. 64 
 
behavior, measured by the degree to which the migrant has honored his or her contractual 
obligations (in the cases of the exchange, insurance, and investment motives) and exhibited 
his care and concern for the family (beyond minimum accepted standards); migrant sons 
and daughters use remittances as stakes on inheritance claims.
39 In effect, parents use 
bequests (or the withholding thereof) as a means to secure remittances from migrant sons 
and daughters, and migrant sons and daughters use remittances as investments in 
inheritance.  
The inheritance model makes the following predictions: The amount remitted by a migrant 
son or daughter is larger and more regular (a) the higher the value of household assets not 
yet bequeathed, (b) the higher the likelihood of being named the major beneficiary, and (c) 
the wealthier the migrant worker. It is smaller and more intermittent the riskier the investment 
in inheritance is perceived to be compared to other investment opportunities. 
Lucas and Stark (1985) discuss the inheritance motive and find that sons who are more 
likely to inherit family-owned assets than daughters do remit more when the household owns 
more cattle, the main inheritable asset. The interpretation of the result, however, cannot 
disentangle the inheritance motive from the exchange motive, since cattle herds of families 
are combined. Hoddinott (1994) finds empirical support for the inheritance motive using data 
from rural Western Kenya. 
   
                                                             
39 Obviously, the behaviors of both parents and offspring are culturally delimited to some extent. Under 
primogeniture, for instance, daughters and low birth-order sons do not have an incentive to make 
inheritance investments, and the “game” would be between the parents and oldest son only. 65 
 
Appendix II 
A Model of Giving Practices 
In the main text, we contend that Filipino giving practice (which is characterized by high 
incidence but small contributions) must be based on social norms, as defined in Fehr and 
Gachter (2000), which  emerged and have persisted from considerations of reciprocity. 
Peterson (1993) provides accounts of how poor Filipino families are able to cope and 
materially prosper by drawing on the resources of a wide network of  blood and affinal 
relations:  A distinctive aspect of these strategies is that, when in need, a family is not 
necessarily assisted by clan members it has specifically helped in the past, but rather by 
those who have extra resources at that time—the intent of assistance apparently being the 
raising up of the average welfare of the clan rather than helping particular members.  
What accounts for such giving practices in poor rural settings, which in time give way to 
norms that persist even after the original conditions no longer hold? What conditions and 
parameters in “imagined communities” make it conducive for giving norms to emerge such 
that, when asked, those families who have something extra are impelled to give but in small 
amounts? This section presents a simple model of giving behavior in an insurance network 
and explores the conditions under which such giving practices are plausible.  
Suppose that, in a poor economy, each family earns y with probability (1 – p) and 0 with 
probability p and that it needs at least c for its upkeep, which in a bad year sets it back by –d 
(perhaps because members have to do hard labor, forage, or travel long distances). The 
family’s expected income is therefore y0 = (1 – p)y – pd. 
Suppose that outcomes are independent across family units, and networks have formed to 
pool resources. Let the insurance scheme be as follows: When a family has a good year, it is 
required to contribute xc/(n + 1 – x) to an assistance fund if y – xc/(n + 1 – x) ≥ c, and y – c > 
0 otherwise, where n + 1 is the size of the network and x is the number of other families 
experiencing a bad year. (Note that when y – xc/(n + 1 – x) < c, the network appropriates y – 
c, even if excess resources are not sufficient to cover the xc that families in need require.) 
When a family has a bad year, it receives c if the network collects (x + 1)c, but is set back by 
–d otherwise, notwithstanding the (n – x)(y – c) < (x +1)c that the network raises. (In other 
words, –d is a  fixed cost that a family suffers when it receives less than c in resources.) The 
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     for x = 0, … , n, 










is the probability that (when the family of interest has a good year) the needs of the families 










is the probability that (when the family of interest has a bad year) the network is able to 
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is the maximum number of other families in need whose requirements can be funded for a 






+  ≡ −≥ 
− 
 
is the maximum number of other families in need whose requirements plus that of the family 
of interest (when it experiences a bad year) can be funded for a given configuration of y, c, 
and n. 
It is helpful to explore the components of y1. Note that it is a weighted sum of expected 
income in a bad year, Q
**c  –  (1  –  Q
**)d, and in a good year, 
*
**
1 ( 1 ) (1 ) ,
x
x x Qy c qx n x Q c
= − +− + − ∑  where the weights are the probabilities p and (1 – p). In 
turn, expected income in a bad year is a weighted sum of c, the amount meted out to each 
family in need when excess resources in the network are sufficient to cover total needs, 
which obtains with probability Q
**, and –d, the cost incurred by a family in need when 
network resources are insufficient, which occurs with probability (1 – Q
**). Similarly, expected 67 
 
income in a good year is a weighted sum of the expected income when income in excess of 
the contribution asked for, 
*
*
1 ( 1 ),
x
x x Qy c qx n x
= − +− ∑   is at least as large as income for 
getting by, c, and when it is not, (1 – Q
*)c. 
Accordingly, a family will opt to remain in a network if and only if y1 ≥ y0, or 




1 ( 1) (1) .
x
x x pQ p q x n x
= = − +− ∑ That is, a family will not opt out of the insurance 
scheme if and only if expected income that is appropriated by the insurance network (1 – 
p)(1 – Q
*)(y – c) (when the family has a good year but the other families in need exceed the 
number that can be adequately supported by the network) is at most as great as the 
reduction in the expected value of disaster income, pQ
**d  (because resource pooling 
reduces the probability of the bad outcome, thereby increasing the expected value of income 
in that state).   
It is readily inferred from (A2.1) that, because their coefficients are probabilities and 
therefore in the unit interval, the higher are the values of d and c, and the lower is the value 
of y (though, by assumption, it must be greater than c), the more likely is (A2.1) satisfied for 
a given configuration of p and n. In other words, families are more likely to remain in an 
insurance network, the higher is the cost of a bad outcome or the value of “guaranteed” 
income, conditional on excess resources being generated by the network, and the lower is 
income in a good year. 
For our purposes, the parameter whose impact is important to explore is the size of the 
network, n. Note that in (A2.1) it enters in Q
** and Q
*, both directly through the component 
probabilities qx and indirectly through x
** in the case of Q
** and through x
* in the case of Q
*. 
While the effect of n can be derived in principle, it is difficult to do so in practice, involving as 
it does derivatives of factorials, which do not have closed form solutions. 
To get a sense of the complexity of this problem, let  
!







− = = −
−
     for z = 0, … , x
* or x
**. 
Then the effect of n on qz is given by 
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if z = x
* or x
**, where 
0 ( 1) !
nx n x e dx n
∞ − Γ+= = ∫  











is the digamma function or the logarithmic derivative of the gamma function, and 
     ′′ ′ = = = −         
* ** () () () 1 ,
c
z n dn x n dn x n dn dn
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which implies that 0 < z′(n) < 1 or that x
* and x
** do not increase as fast as n. 
To get around this problem, we therefore work with the general form of the derivatives of n 
through Q
* and Q
** instead of qx. Note that if (A2.1) holds, the effect of n for the condition to 



















































To get a sense of (A2.2), observe first the effect of n on the probability of the “sufficiently 
insured” outcomes Q (i.e., either Q
* or Q
**). Note that it is the sum of two quantities: First, 
(∂Q/∂z)(∂z/∂n), where z = x
* or x
**, measures the possible increase in Q because, holding the 69 
 
shape of the (binomial) probability distribution fixed, the maximum number of families that 
can be covered may increase with n, as indicated by 
     ′′ = = = −       
* ** () () 1 ,
c
dz x n dn x n dn dn
y
 
which implies that 0 ≤ dz/dn < 1 or that there is a “bottling up” effect until dn is sufficiently 
large to effect an integer-unit effect on dz. Second, ∂Q/∂n  measures the change in Q 
because, holding x
* or x
** fixed, the shape of the binomial probability distribution becomes 
more and more that of the normal distribution as n increases. In other words, the effect of n 
on the binomial probability distribution is that it reduces the probabilities of (extremely) small 
and large values of x and increases the probabilities of its mid-range values. The net effect 
of  n  on  Q  can therefore be positive, negative, or zero, depending on whether x
*  or  x
** 
extends out at a rate faster than, slower than, or equal to the “normalizing” shape of the 
binomial probability distribution. The net effect is more likely to be positive, the closer the 
value of p is to 0, since this implies that the positive skewness of the probability distribution 
disappears more slowly. 
We can now explore the four possible cases of (A2.2). Suppose that Q
**′[x
**′(n)] + Q




*′(n) > 0 automatically satisfies (A2.2). That is, the insurance scheme 
continues to be viable if, as n increases, the rates of change in the probabilities of events in 
which insurance coverage is adequate, both when the family of interest is a transfer provider 
and when it is a transfer recipient, are positive. This is because Q
**′[x
**′(n)] + Q
**′(n) > 0 
decreases the expected value of disaster income, and Q
*′[x
*′(n)] + Q
*′(n) > 0 decreases the 
expected value of appropriated income. In contrast, if Q
*′[x
*′(n)] + Q
*′(n) <  0, then the 
insurance scheme remains viable only if, as n  increases, the rate of decrease in this 
probability per unit of increase in Q
**′[x
**′(n)] + Q
**′(n) is less than or equal to the ratio of the 
expected value of disaster income averted [–(–pd)], to that of foregone income, which is the 
marginal benefit to marginal cost ratio. If this were not so, so that the rate at which the 
probability of outcomes that are not adequately covered by the insurance scheme (when the 
family of interest has a good year), 1 – Q
*, relative to the rate at which the probability of 
outcomes covered by the insurance scheme (when the family has a bad year), Q
**, rises 
faster than the marginal benefit to marginal cost ratio, then the family of interest would be 
giving up more to the insurance scheme in the form of the expected value of foregone 













**′(n) is greater than the expected value of disaster income averted 
per unit of the expected value of income foregone. In other words, if Q
** is falling as n 
increases, 1 – Q




*′(n) < 0, given Q
**′[x
**′(n)] + Q
**′(n) < 0—is not possible, since 
then the inequality 
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cannot be satisfied. 
A final issue remains to be considered. What configuration of parameters gave rise to the 
Filipino giving norm which impels everyone to give  but in small amounts? The model 
suggests that the difference between y and c cannot be too large relative to d; otherwise, 
(A2.1) cannot be satisfied. This explains why the insurance scheme can only work in poor 
environments. In addition, the model suggests that p must be small for n to be large, for a 
given (small) difference between y  and  c. The small value of p  allows the number of 
adequately insured families to grow at a faster rate than the roll out of the binomial 
probability distribution, as the number of insured family units increases. The consequence of 
a large n is then that everyone who is better off gives, but because the difference between y 
and c is small, the amounts given are not sizeable.   
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 Appendix Table 1a 
Testing the Endogeneity of Labor Income, All Overseas Workers 




    Variable  OLS  
 
Heckman's Selection (Two step) 
 















                                                          Labor income (Log) 
     
-0,52662 
   
0,13408 
   
-0,46515 
   
0,13231 
   
       
0,248  ** 
 
0,151 
   
0,286 
   
0,162 
   
       
0,284  * 
 
0,149 
   
0,290 
   
0,149 
                                    Predicted residuals 
     
0,36353 
   
-0,14075 
   
0,31777 
   
-0,14080 
   
       
0,249 
   
0,149 
   
0,268 
   
0,155 
   
       
0,284 
   
0,149 
   
0,287 
   
0,148 
    Instrumental Variables 
                              Tropical cyclone occurrences  -0,06956 
                            (Total number in a year)  0,024  *** 
                         
 
0,024  *** 
                                                          Provincial employment rate  -0,02620 
                           
 
0,013  ** 
                         
 
0,014  * 
                                                          Characteristics of overseas worker 
                            (Dummy base category: Son or daughter) 
                            Household head or spouse  0,35581 
   
0,38618 
   
0,03970 
   
0,33214 
   
0,04717 
   
 
0,229 
   
0,266 
   
0,154 
   
0,270 
   
0,162 
   
 
0,213  * 
 
0,290 
   
0,157 
   
0,289 
   
0,156 
                                    Son- or daughter-in-law  0,22066 
   
-0,24554 
   
-0,22331 
   
-0,24918 
   
-0,22986 
   
 
0,219 
   
0,227 
   
0,143 
   
0,230 
   
0,154 
   
 
0,199 
   
0,251 
   
0,156 
   
0,256 
   
0,152 
                                    Grandson or granddaughter  1,19107 
   
0,31846 
   
-0,03050 
   
0,08407 
   
-0,05281 
   
 
0,578  ** 
 
0,621 
   
0,400 
   
0,694 
   
0,309 
   
 
0,316  *** 
 
2,035 
   
0,315 
   
2,418 
   
0,307 
                                    Other relative and non-relative  0,41369 
   
0,02260 
   
-0,60084 
   
0,04530 
   
-0,59368 
   
 
0,245  * 
 
0,272 
   
0,167  *** 
 
0,274 
   
0,188  *** 
 
 
0,228  * 
 
0,291 
   
0,189  *** 
 
0,292 
   
0,188  *** 
                                  Male  -0,22522 
   
-0,19719 
   
0,19100 
   
-0,22834 
   
0,18287 
   
 
0,119  * 
 
0,135 
   
0,080  ** 
 
0,127  * 
 
0,084  ** 
 
 
0,115  * 
 
0,139 
   
0,081  ** 
 
0,138  * 
 
0,081  ** 
                                  Married  -0,02102 
   
0,08466 
   
0,13141 
   
0,07636 
   
0,13443 
   
 
0,158 
   
0,164 
   
0,098 
   
0,167 
   
0,104 
   
 
0,145 
   
0,184 
   
0,105 
   
0,188 
   
0,104 
                                    Age in years  -0,02641 
   
0,00969 
   
0,01146 
   
0,00171 
   
0,01214 
   
 
0,032 
   
0,035 
   
0,020 
   
0,035 
   
0,019 
   
 
0,029 
   
0,039 
   
0,021 
   
0,039 
   
0,021 
                                    Age in years squared  0,00032 
   
-0,00016 
   
-0,00004 
   
-0,00004 
   
-0,00005 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                    (Dummy base category: College graduate) 
                           Attended grade school  -0,09870 
   
-0,38766 
   
-0,56436 
   
-0,38524 
   
-0,58302 
   
 
0,419 
   
0,377 
   
0,265  ** 
 
0,364 
   




   
0,901 
   
0,258  ** 
 
1,024 
   
0,245  ** 
                                  Grade school graduate  -0,82991 
   
-0,48663 
   
-0,44252 
   
-0,47488 
   
-0,44785 
   
 
0,236  *** 
 
0,332 
   
0,192  ** 
 
0,365 
   
0,194  ** 
 
 
0,236  *** 
 
0,390 
   
0,191  ** 
 
0,391 
   
0,189  ** 
                                  Attended high school  -0,79146 
   
-0,78969 
   
-0,21410 
   
-0,71885 
   
-0,22454 
   
 
0,190  *** 
 
0,277  *** 
 
0,180 
   
0,338  ** 
 
0,205 
   
 
0,183  *** 
 
0,316  ** 
 
0,178 
   
0,323  ** 
 
0,179 
                                    High school graduate  -0,67376 
   
-0,29035 
   
-0,21274 
   
-0,29517 
   
-0,21535 
   
 
0,120  *** 
 
0,211 
   
0,124  * 
 
0,219 
   
0,128  * 
 
 
0,115  *** 
 
0,237 
   
0,126  * 
 
0,236 
   
0,125  * 
                                  Attended post-secondary school  -0,42701 
   
-0,44248 
   
-0,20098 
   
-0,31459 
   
-0,19780 
   
 
0,215  ** 
 
0,250  * 
 
0,152 
   
0,330 
   
0,186 
   
 
0,200  ** 
 
0,275 
   
0,181 
   
0,294 
   
0,184 
                                    Attended college  -0,41170 
   
-0,13573 
   
-0,14474 
   
-0,12742 
   
-0,14558 
   
 
0,117  *** 
 
0,165 
   
0,094 
   
0,161 
   
0,090 
   
 
0,114  *** 
 
0,180 
   
0,093 
   
0,180 
   
0,092 
                                    Work experience abroad  -0,00821 
   
0,02233 
   
0,01135 
   
0,01718 
   
0,01164 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,009 
   
0,010  ** 
 
0,006  ** 
 
0,013 
   




   
0,011  ** 
 
0,006  ** 
 
0,012 
   
0,006  ** 
                                  Work experience abroad  0,00010 
   
-0,00001 
   
-0,00007 
   
0,00006 
   
-0,00007 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                                                    Last left the country   -0,02611 
   
0,05098 
   
0,01746 
   
0,05111 
   
0,01923 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,014  * 
 
0,015  *** 
 
0,012 
   
0,016  *** 
 
0,018 
   
 
0,013  * 
 
0,015  *** 
 
0,014 
   
0,016  *** 
 
0,015 
                                    Last left the country   0,00034 
   
-0,00034 
   
-0,00025 
   
-0,00036 
   
-0,00027 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
 
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
 
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                    Type of visa 
                              (Dummy base category: Working visa) 
                            Immigrant visa  0,33799 
   
0,16475 
   
-0,32737 
   
0,35511 
   
-0,32033 
   
 
0,276 
   
0,364 
   
0,171  * 
 
0,433 
   




   
0,819 
   
0,193  * 
 
0,898 
   
0,194  * 
                                  Other visa  0,56952 
   
-0,54491 
   
-0,00929 
   
-0,56485 
   
-0,02816 
   
 
0,306  * 
 
0,303  * 
 
0,237 
   
0,299  * 
 
0,268 
   
 
0,253  ** 
 
0,333 
   
0,281 
   
0,333  * 
 
0,266 
    Kind of work in host country 
                              (Dummy base category: Unskilled worker 
                            Special occupation  1,17792 
   
0,27084 
   
-0,02234 
   
0,17004 
   
-0,00561 
   
 
0,591  ** 
 
0,691 
   
0,415 
   
0,644 
   
0,408 
   
 
0,504  ** 
 
1,989 
   
0,472 
   
2,482 
   
0,467 
                                    Corporate executive, manager,   0,75149 
   
0,42780 
   
0,47406 
   
0,34292 
   
0,47389 
    or proprietor  0,303  ** 
 
0,382 
   
0,218  ** 
 
0,433 
   
0,194  ** 
 
 
0,320  ** 
 
0,644 
   
0,186  ** 
 
0,709 
   
0,187  ** 
                                 Professional  0,39978 
   
0,84626 
   
0,25046 
   
0,79059 
   
0,25917 
   
 
0,174  ** 
 
0,244  *** 
 
0,133  * 
 
0,288  *** 
 
0,161 
   
 
0,185  ** 
 
0,288  *** 
 
0,139  * 
 
0,297  *** 
 
0,140  * 
                                  Technician or associate  0,48808 
   
0,13405 
   
0,33206 
   
0,16666 
   
0,33344 
    professional  0,170  *** 
 
0,208 
   
0,128  *** 
 
0,217 
   
0,128  *** 
 
 
0,163  *** 
 
0,233 
   
0,125  *** 
 
0,235 
   
0,124  *** 
                                  Clerk  0,43148 
   
0,04133 
   
-0,00153 
   
0,03830 
   
0,00303 
   
 
0,243  * 
 
0,277 
   
0,162 
   
0,243 
   
0,168 
   
 
0,228  * 
 
0,259 
   
0,178 
   
0,260 
   
0,177 
                                    Service or sales workers  0,22030 
   
0,19032 
   
0,19984 
   
0,21867 
   
0,20441 
   
 
0,149 
   
0,173 
   
0,096  ** 
 
0,178 
   




   
0,189 
   
0,095  ** 
 
0,187 
   
0,094  ** 
                                  Farmer, forestry worker,   -1,20932 
   
-1,66470 
   
0,06846 
   
-1,52799 
   
0,03693 
    or fisherman  0,639  * 
 
0,637  *** 
 
0,475 
   
0,705  ** 
 
0,517 
   
 
0,993 
   
2,347 
   
0,525 
   
2,770 
   
0,521 
                                    Tradesman or related worker  0,36922 
   
0,24052 
   
0,10996 
   
0,26656 
   
0,11343 
   
 
0,156  ** 
 
0,191 
   
0,109 
   
0,188 
   
0,113 
   
 
0,154  ** 
 
0,201 
   
0,111 
   
0,199 
   
0,111 
                                    Plant & machine operator or  0,47972 
   
0,07271 
   
0,16886 
   
0,07752 
   
0,16929 
    assembler  0,158  *** 
 
0,207 
   
0,121 
   
0,206 
   
0,119 
   
 
0,161  *** 
 
0,231 
   
0,120 
   
0,226 
   
0,120 
                                    Charateristics of host country 
                              By income 
                              (Dummy base category: High income country) 
                            Low income country  0,03332 
   
-0,21315 
   
0,50800 
   
-0,33326 
   
0,50322 
   
 
0,650 
   
0,678 
   
0,395 
   
0,547 
   
0,333 
   
 
0,566 
   
2,803 
   
0,382 
   
11,070 
   
0,375 
                                    Lower middle-income country  0,13269 
   
-0,02877 
   
-0,09931 
   
0,03337 
   
-0,09111 
   
 
0,278 
   
0,299 
   
0,170 
   
0,318 
   
0,173 
   
 
0,283 
   
0,385 
   
0,181 
   
0,391 
   
0,179 
                                    Upper middle-income country  -0,14881 
   
-0,10728 
   
0,18608 
   
-0,09715 
   
0,18506 
   
 
0,130 
   
0,140 
   
0,081  ** 
 
0,141 
   




   
0,151 
   
0,081  ** 
 
0,152 
   
0,080  ** 
                                  Other income country  -0,57979 
   
0,11842 
   
0,64894 
   
0,07496 
   
0,65453 
   
 
0,359 
   
0,466 
   
0,228  *** 
 
0,432 
   




   
1,890 
   
0,219  *** 
 
2,335 
   
0,216  *** 
                                  By location 
                              (Dummy base category: In Asia and the Pacific) 
                            In Africa, Eastern   0,12140 
   
-0,10456 
   
0,39177 
   
-0,32805 
   
0,37324 
    and Central Europe  0,460 
   
0,495 
   
0,285 
   
0,534 
   




   
1,136 
   
0,209  * 
 
1,352 
   
0,205  * 
                                  In the Middle East  0,37905 
   
0,22478 
   
-0,28824 
   
0,22069 
   
-0,28462 
   
 
0,125  *** 
 
0,155 
   
0,093  *** 
 
0,161 
   
0,096  *** 
 
 
0,125  *** 
 
0,181 
   
0,095  *** 
 
0,180 
   
0,094  *** 
                                  In America and Western Europe  0,11503 
   
0,40235 
   
0,27474 
   
0,41149 
   
0,28259 
   
 
0,132 
   
0,159  ** 
 
0,086  *** 
 
0,177  ** 
 
0,090  *** 
  
0,142 
   
0,181  ** 
 
0,078  *** 
 
0,183  ** 
 
0,078  *** 
                                  Characteristics of origin household 
                            Asset income  0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                    Male household head  0,07176 
   
-0,27426 
   
-0,16796 
   
-0,27680 
   
-0,17688 
   
 
0,096 
   
0,111  ** 
 
0,062  *** 
 
0,111  ** 
 




   
0,121  ** 
 
0,065  *** 
 
0,121  ** 
 
0,065  *** 
                                  Age in years of the household  0,02545 
   
-0,00087 
   
-0,00700 
   
-0,00033 
   
-0,00718 
    head  0,023 
   
0,027 
   
0,014 
   
0,024 
   
0,015 
   
 
0,023 
   
0,027 
   
0,016 
   
0,026 
   
0,016 
                                    Age in years of the household  -0,00026 
   
0,00003 
   
0,00002 
   
0,00003 
   
0,00003 
    head squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                    Number of household members   -0,02401 
   
0,02063 
   
0,07978 
   
0,02032 
   
0,08083 
    14 years and younger  0,032 
   
0,035 
   
0,020  *** 
 
0,040 
   




   
0,039 
   
0,021  *** 
 
0,040 
   
0,021  *** 
                                  Number of household members   0,20808 
   
0,15907 
   
0,03671 
   
0,13009 
   
0,03770 
    between 15 and 24 years old  0,035  *** 
 
0,067  ** 
 
0,039 
   
0,074  * 
 
0,043 
   
 
0,034  *** 
 
0,072  ** 
 
0,041 
   
0,075  * 
 
0,041 
                                    Number of household members   0,40271 
   
0,14296 
   
-0,03521 
   
0,15541 
   
-0,03309 
    25 years and older  0,040  *** 
 
0,110 
   
0,065 
   
0,114 
   
0,067 
   
 
0,036  *** 
 
0,125 
   
0,066 
   
0,126 
   
0,065 
                                    (Dummy base category: Resides in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon) 
                Resides in the rest of Luzon  -0,27087 
   
-0,14086 
   
-0,10130 
   
-0,08682 
   
-0,09662 
   
 
0,155  * 
 
0,214 
   
0,125 
   
0,240 
   
0,123 
   
 
0,163  * 
 
0,242 
   
0,125 
   
0,247 
   
0,123 
                                    Resides in the Visayas  -0,70246 
   
-0,47846 
   
0,11985 
   
-0,41486 
   
0,11953 
   
 
0,133  *** 
 
0,246  * 
 
0,147 
   
0,274 
   
0,158 
   
 
0,143  *** 
 
0,286  * 
 
0,145 
   
0,287 
   
0,145 
                                    Resides in Mindanao  -1,07002 
   
-0,55821 
   
-0,37051 
   
-0,46762 
   
-0,37248 
   
 
0,171  *** 
 
0,275  ** 
 
0,168  ** 
 
0,346 
   
0,185  ** 
 
 
0,180  *** 
 
0,308  * 
 
0,170  ** 
 
0,318 
   
0,169  ** 
                                  Constant  12,44301 
   
4,18071 
   
9,36386 
   
3,71190 
   
9,29882 
   
 
1,412  *** 
 
2,686 
   
1,562  *** 
 
2,914 
   
1,599  *** 
 
 
1,446  *** 
 
3,065 
   
1,670  *** 
 
3,103 
   
1,656  *** 
                                                 
ρ (Heckman ML)  -0,65614 
                           
 
0,477 
                           
 
0,347  * 
                                                          σ (Heckman ML)  0,92013 
                           
 
0,092  +++ 
                         
 
0,048  +++ 
                                                          λ (Heckman Two step) 
           
-0,69192 
               
             
0,325  ** 
             
             
0,368  * 
                     
        
        
        
        
  
                                R
2  0,234 
                            Log Pseudo Likelihood Function 
                 
-2369,366 
          Number of observations  1669 
   
1669 
   
1445 
   
1669 
   
1445 
                                                   
Note: 
                              The numbers below the coefficient/parameter estimates are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. The first is generated 
from one regression run based on the applicable sample; the second from bootstrapping based on 1,000  replications. 
                                *   (+)   -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.1. 
                          **  (++)  -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.05. 
                          *** (+++) -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.01. 
                                                           Appendix Table 1b 
Testing the Endogeneity of Labor Income, Overseas Workers who are Heads or Spouses of Heads of Households 
        




    Variable  OLS  
 
Heckman's Selection (Two step) 
 















                          Labor income (Log) 
     
0,16896 
   
-0,02636 
   
0,16993 
   
-0,02126 
   
       
0,336 
   
0,142 
   
0,348 
   
0,122 
   
       
0,474 
   
0,131 
   
0,484 
   
0,130 
                                    Predicted residuals 
     
-0,29868 
   
0,00832 
   
-0,29812 
   
-0,00034 
   
       
0,342 
   
0,144 
   
0,353 
   
0,124 
   
       
0,478 
   
0,133 
   
0,490 
   
0,133 
                                    Instrumental Variables 
                              Tropical cyclone occurrences  -0,08174 
                            (Total number in a year)  0,037  ** 
                         
 
0,039  ** 
                                                          Provincial employment rate  -0,03800 
                           
 
0,022  * 
                         
 
0,024 
                                                            Characteristics of overseas worker 
                            Male  -0,38123 
   
0,31925 
   
0,23006 
   
0,31636 
   
0,23886 
   
 
0,234 
   
0,295 
   
0,122  * 
 
0,281 
   
0,120  ** 
 
 
0,220  * 
 
0,405 
   
0,126  * 
 
0,426 
   
0,125  * 
                                  Married  -0,36648 
   
1,68064 
   
0,62187 
   
1,67972 
   
0,70725 
   
 
0,521 
   
0,503  *** 
 
0,324  * 
 
0,450  *** 
 




   
0,851  ** 
 
0,415 
   
0,882  * 
 
0,406  * 
                                  Age in years  -0,22915 
   
0,00258 
   
0,01568 
   
0,00117 
   
0,01607 
   
 
0,083  *** 
 
0,120 
   
0,054 
   
0,120 
   
0,056 
   
 
0,092  ** 
 
0,174 
   
0,060 
   
0,178 
   
0,060 
                                    Age in years squared  0,00234 
   
-0,00016 
   
-0,00019 
   
-0,00015 
   
-0,00020 
   
 
0,001  ** 
 
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
 
0,001  ** 
 
0,002 
   
0,001 
   
0,002 
   
0,001 
                                    (Dummy base category: College graduate) 
                            Attended grade school  0,55996 
   
-0,63113 
   
-0,63264 
   
-0,61969 
   
-0,66012 
   
 
0,598 
   
0,577 
   
0,309  ** 
 
0,575 
   




   
2,151 
   
0,398 
   
2,525 
   
0,389  * 
                                  Grade school graduate  -0,56599 
   
0,22554 
   
-0,67203 
   
0,23135 
   
-0,66500 
   
 
0,346 
   
0,495 
   
0,187  *** 
 
0,501 
   




   
1,550 
   
0,189  *** 
 
1,815 
   
0,188  *** 
                                  Attended high school  -0,45055 
   
-0,80529 
   
-0,30135 
   
-0,80337 
   
-0,33876 
   
 
0,295 
   
0,359  ** 
 
0,171  * 
 
0,334  ** 
 




   
0,465  * 
 
0,175  * 
 
0,487  * 
 
0,171  ** 
                                  High school graduate  -0,50157 
   
-0,00723 
   
-0,30633 
   
-0,00424 
   
-0,30755 
   
 
0,196  ** 
 
0,300 
   
0,119  ** 
 
0,290 
   
0,112  *** 
 
 
0,203  ** 
 
0,394 
   
0,115  *** 
 
0,406 
   
0,115  *** 
                                 Attended post-secondary school  0,00018 
   
-0,49362 
   
-0,11649 
   
-0,49843 
   
-0,13816 
   
 
0,358 
   
0,420 
   
0,177 
   
0,376 
   
0,189 
   
 
0,345 
   
1,221 
   
0,202 
   
1,408 
   
0,202 
                                    Attended college  -0,29884 
   
0,19863 
   
-0,23502 
   
0,20032 
   
-0,23332 
   
 
0,200 
   
0,286 
   
0,104  ** 
 
0,246 
   




   
0,348 
   
0,112  ** 
 
0,359 
   
0,111  ** 
                                  Work experience abroad  -0,02153 
   
0,03160 
   
0,02261 
   
0,03132 
   
0,02353 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,013  * 
 
0,020 
   
0,007  *** 
 
0,019 
   
0,006  *** 
 
 
0,011  * 
 
0,028 
   
0,007  *** 
 
0,029 
   
0,007  *** 
                                  Work experience abroad  0,00030 
   
-0,00009 
   
-0,00016 
   
-0,00008 
   
-0,00016 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  ** 
 
 
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
                                  Last left the country   -0,02168 
   
0,05186 
   
0,03623 
   
0,05182 
   
0,04121 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,022 
   
0,024  ** 
 
0,014  ** 
 
0,023  ** 
 




   
0,032 
   
0,019  * 
 
0,033 
   
0,018  ** 
                                  Last left the country   0,00024 
   
-0,00015 
   
-0,00038 
   
-0,00015 
   
-0,00042 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000  ** 
 
0,000 
   




   
0,001 
   
0,000  * 
 
0,001 
   
0,000  * 
                                  Type of visa 
                              (Dummy base category: Working visa) 
                            Immigrant visa  0,93089 
   
-0,56532 
   
-0,12624 
   
-0,54659 
   
-0,14668 
   
 
0,445  ** 
 
0,726 
   
0,251 
   
0,896 
   
0,269 
   
 
0,412  ** 
 
3,621 
   
0,290 
   
4,213 
   
0,287 
                                    Other visa  0,75123 
   
-0,95123 
   
-0,26273 
   
-0,94405 
   
-0,32151 
   
 
0,466 
   
0,493  * 
 
0,283 
   
0,464  ** 
 
0,368 
   
 
0,393  * 
 
0,887 
   
0,406 
   
0,970 
   
0,391 
    Kind of work in host country 
                              (Dummy base category: Unskilled worker) 
                            Corporate executive, manager,   0,81081 
   
-0,51303 
   
0,69550 
   
-0,50635 
   
0,67029 
    or proprietor  0,442  * 
 
0,604 
   
0,252  *** 
 
0,656 
   
0,227  *** 
 
 
0,471  * 
 
1,682 
   
0,238  *** 
 
1,953 
   
0,239  *** 
                                  Professional  0,85412 
   
-0,16302 
   
0,28885 
   
-0,16396 
   
0,27723 
   
 
0,348  ** 
 
0,599 
   
0,205 
   
0,487 
   
0,220 
   
 
0,392  ** 
 
2,079 
   
0,225 
   
2,474 
   
0,225 
                                    Technician or associate  0,52250 
   
-1,16729 
   
0,36545 
   
-1,16501 
   
0,32292 
    professional  0,310  * 
 
0,400  *** 
 
0,185  ** 
 
0,343  *** 
 




   
0,486  ** 
 
0,189  * 
 
0,502  ** 
 
0,184  * 
                                  Clerk  0,55282 
   
-0,04012 
   
0,26526 
   
-0,04032 
   
0,27262 
   
 
0,508 
   
0,737 
   
0,252 
   
0,517 
   
0,227 
   
 
0,585 
   
2,677 
   
0,256 
   
11,277 
   
0,254 
                                    Service or sales workers  0,37620 
   
0,00878 
   
0,23872 
   
0,00966 
   
0,23383 
   
 
0,244 
   
0,339 
   
0,128  * 
 
0,358 
   




   
0,730 
   
0,122  * 
 
0,754 
   
0,122  * 
                                  Tradesman or related worker  0,63701 
   
-0,41407 
   
0,23315 
   
-0,41297 
   
0,21702 
   
 
0,252  ** 
 
0,383 
   
0,152 
   
0,359 
   
0,130  * 
 
 
0,234  *** 
 
0,481 
   
0,132  * 
 
0,494 
   
0,132  * 
                                 Plant & machine operator or  0,82868 
   
-0,76896 
   
0,31197 
   
-0,76232 
   
0,28708 
    assembler  0,259  *** 
 
0,428  * 
 
0,178  * 
 
0,423  * 
 
0,157  * 
 
 
0,261  *** 
 
0,577 
   
0,160  * 
 
0,602 
   
0,160  * 
                                  Charateristics of host country 
                              By income 
                              (Dummy base category: High income country) 
                            Lower middle-income country  0,04230 
   
-0,31678 
   
0,27316 
   
-0,29984 
   
0,26322 
   
 
0,467 
   
0,572 
   
0,223 
   
0,687 
   
0,211 
   
 
0,503 
   
2,610 
   
0,247 
   
2,966 
   
0,244 
                                    Upper middle-income country  -0,32669 
   
-0,56265 
   
0,10358 
   
-0,56034 
   
0,08512 
   
 
0,207 
   
0,275  ** 
 
0,110 
   
0,285  ** 
 
0,091 
   
 
0,215 
   
0,405 
   
0,105 
   
0,410 
   
0,100 
                                    By location 
                              (Dummy base category: In the Middle East) 
                            In Africa, Eastern   -0,34730 
   
-0,06529 
   
0,29323 
   
-0,08646 
   
0,28546 
    and Central Europe  0,643 
   
0,803 
   
0,328 
   
0,767 
   
0,201 
   
 
0,871 
   
2,501 
   
0,263 
   
3,029 
   
0,262 
                                    In America and Western Europe  -0,34606 
   
-0,12710 
   
0,51958 
   
-0,12204 
   
0,51126 
   
 
0,252 
   
0,362 
   
0,127  *** 
 
0,363 
   




   
0,648 
   
0,125  *** 
 
0,670 
   
0,124  *** 
                                  In South Asia, East Asia,   -0,45495 
   
-0,47363 
   
0,22025 
   
-0,47664 
   
0,20243 
    and the Pacific  0,204  ** 
 
0,279  * 
 
0,115  * 
 
0,302 
   
0,105  * 
 
 
0,212  ** 
 
0,413 
   
0,115  * 
 
0,424 
   
0,113  * 
                                  Characteristics of origin household 
                            Asset income  0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                    Male household head  0,18044 
   
-0,86869 
   
-0,23214 
   
-0,87495 
   
-0,25691 
   
 
0,173 
   
0,250  *** 
 
0,095  ** 
 
0,240  *** 
 




   
0,433  ** 
 
0,092  ** 
 
0,447  * 
 
0,088  *** 
                                  Age in years of the household  0,10662 
   
0,08925 
   
0,03492 
   
0,08859 
   
0,03764 
    head  0,067 
   
0,096 
   
0,035 
   
0,084 
   
0,034 
   
 
0,074 
   
0,132 
   
0,040 
   
0,138 
   
0,039 
                                    Age in years of the household  -0,00086 
   
-0,00097 
   
-0,00033 
   
-0,00096 
   
-0,00036 
    head squared  0,001 
   
0,001 
   
0,000 
   
0,001 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,001 
   
0,002 
   
0,000 
   
0,002 
   
0,000 
                                    Number of household members   -0,04411 
   
0,00414 
   
0,05359 
   
0,00306 
   
0,05317 
    14 years and younger  0,054 
   
0,068 
   
0,027  ** 
 
0,062 
   




   
0,084 
   
0,028  * 
 
0,087 
   
0,028  * 
                                  Number of household members   0,28121 
   
0,10390 
   
0,06318 
   
0,10333 
   
0,06514 
    between 15 and 24 years old  0,058  *** 
 
0,122 
   
0,050 
   
0,121 
   
0,049 
   
 
0,055  *** 
 
0,174 
   
0,050 
   
0,179 
   
0,050 
                                    Number of household members   0,39666 
   
-0,29850 
   
-0,01593 
   
-0,29720 
   
-0,02695 
    25 years and older  0,080  *** 
 
0,171  * 
 
0,070 
   
0,160  * 
 
0,067 
   
 
0,071  *** 
 
0,227 
   
0,070 
   
0,233 
   
0,069 
                                    (Dummy base category: Resides in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon) 
               Resides in the rest of Luzon  -0,30037 
   
0,35630 
   
-0,07919 
   
0,35939 
   
-0,06498 
   
 
0,233 
   
0,355 
   
0,149 
   
0,367 
   
0,125 
   
 
0,244 
   
0,496 
   
0,139 
   
0,511 
   
0,138 
                                    Resides in the Visayas  -0,70400 
   
0,09855 
   
-0,04100 
   
0,10333 
   
-0,03295 
   
 
0,219  *** 
 
0,404 
   
0,163 
   
0,411 
   
0,143 
   
 
0,253  *** 
 
0,664 
   
0,156 
   
0,715 
   
0,155 
                                    Resides in Mindanao  -1,04221 
   
0,25941 
   
-0,28736 
   
0,25011 
   
-0,28203 
   
 
0,295  *** 
 
0,411 
   
0,178 
   
0,428 




0,319  *** 
 
0,587 




   
0,170 * 
                                  Constant  17,06698 
   
-4,61133 
   
8,43127 
   
-4,57381 
   
8,11137 
   
 
2,366  *** 
 
5,037 








2,526  *** 
 
6,963 




   
2,057 *** 
                                             
                                ρεu    -0,05063 
                           
 
0,091 
                           
 
1,225 
                                                            σu  0,78394 
                           
 
0,032  *** 
                         
 
0,038  *** 
                                                          σεu 
           
-0,25380 
                (coefficient of inverse Mills' ratio λ) 
         
0,311 
               
             
0,364 
                                                        
       
        
       
       
  
R
2  0,223 
                            Log Pseudo Likelihood Function 
                 
-965,884 
          Number of observations  766 
   
766 
   
688 
   
766 
   
688 
                                               
Note: 
                              The numbers below the coefficient/parameter estimates are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. The first is generated 
from one regression run based on the applicable sample; the second from bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications. 
*   (+)   -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.1. 
                        **  (++)  -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.05. 
                      *** (+++) -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.01. 
                       Appendix Table 1c 
Testing the Endogeneity of Labor Income, Overseas Workers who are neither Heads nor Spouses of Heads of Households  
        




    Variable  OLS  
 
Heckman's Selection (Two step) 
 















                                                                     
                                Labor income (Log) 
     
-1,11812 
   
0,74490 
   
-0,69620 
   
0,63753 
   
       
0,402  *** 
 
0,487 
   
0,414  * 
 
0,295  ** 
 
       
0,468  ** 
 
0,339  ** 
 
0,530 
   
0,334  * 
                                  Predicted residuals 
     
0,92911 
   
-0,70065 
   
0,56979 
   
-0,61405 
   
       
0,402  ** 
 
0,465 
   
0,410 
   
0,298  ** 
 
       
0,468  ** 
 
0,331  ** 
 
0,521 
   
0,330  * 
                                  Instrumental Variables 
                              Tropical cyclone occurrences  -0,06176 
                            (Total number in a year)  0,033  * 
                         
 
0,029  ** 
                                                          Provincial employment rate  -0,02007 
                           
 
0,016 
                           
 
0,016 
                                                            Characteristics of overseas worker 
                            (Dummy base category: Son or daughter) 
                            Son- or daughter-in-law  0,15465 
   
-0,04768 
   
-0,26211 
   
-0,17737 
   
-0,29125 
   
 
0,214 
   
0,236 
   
0,240 
   
0,224 
   




   
0,253 
   
0,182 
   
0,269 
   
0,178 
                                    Grandson or granddaughter  1,23739 
   
1,12182 
   
-0,90408 
   
0,38885 
   
-0,85677 
   
 
0,553  ** 
 
0,757 
   
0,836 
   
0,644 
   
0,470  * 
 
 
0,356  *** 
 
2,250 
   
0,525  * 
 
2,499 
   
0,521 
                                    Other relative and non-relative  0,20146 
   
-0,02774 
   
-0,79077 
   
0,07514 
   
-0,76095 
   
 
0,251 
   
0,280 
   
0,286  *** 
 
0,239 
   




   
0,295 
   
0,206  *** 
 
0,298 
   
0,206  *** 
                                  Male  -0,11780 
   
-0,43666 
   
0,28123 
   
-0,38137 
   
0,20606 
   
 
0,132 
   
0,150  *** 
 
0,182 
   
0,124  *** 
 




   
0,157  *** 
 
0,129  ** 
 
0,164  ** 
 
0,114  * 
                                                                  Married  -0,01670 
   
-0,18909 
   
0,21210 
   
-0,06619 
   
0,20974 
   
 
0,162 
   
0,176 
   
0,179 
   
0,159 
   




   
0,192 
   
0,124  * 
 
0,204 
   
0,124  * 
                                  Age in years  0,01144 
   
-0,01084 
   
-0,00781 
   
-0,01947 
   
-0,00841 
   
 
0,039 
   
0,057 
   
0,040 
   
0,042 
   
0,023 
   
 
0,041 
   
0,061 
   
0,031 
   
0,062 
   
0,030 
                                    Age in years squared  -0,00014 
   
0,00030 
   
0,00015 
   
0,00038 
   
0,00017 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
0,000 
   
0,001 
   
0,000 
                                    (Dummy base category: College graduate) 
                            Attended grade school  -1,42831 
   
-2,27924 
   
0,71086 
   
-1,73324 
   
0,36083 
    
0,650  ** 
 
0,835  *** 
 
1,107 
   
0,714  ** 
 
0,550 
   
 
0,443  *** 
 
2,318 
   
0,723 
   
2,549 
   
0,633 
                                    Grade school graduate  -1,17740 
   
-1,33771 
   
0,45940 
   
-0,92053 
   
0,31278 
   
 
0,349  *** 
 
0,615  ** 
 
0,679 
   
0,617 
   
0,426 
   
 
0,400  *** 
 
1,560 
   
0,495 
   
1,654 
   
0,475 
                                    Attended high school  -1,05373 
   
-1,26261 
   
0,22421 
   
-0,58295 
   
0,13520 
   
 
0,257  *** 
 
0,503  ** 
 
0,610 
   
0,545 
   
0,386 
   
 
0,263  *** 
 
0,594  ** 
 
0,434 
   
0,695 
   
0,426 
                                    High school graduate  -0,79433 
   
-0,85010 
   
0,17146 
   
-0,50022 
   
0,09710 
   
 
0,151  *** 
 
0,356  ** 
 
0,409 
   
0,357 
   
0,258 
   
 
0,145  *** 
 
0,415  ** 
 
0,293 
   
0,466 
   
0,287 
                                    Attended post-secondary school  -0,65649 
   
-0,91017 
   
0,10688 
   
-0,37061 
   
0,03338 
   
 
0,264  ** 
 
0,392  ** 
 
0,458 
   
0,389 
   
0,305 
   
 
0,241  *** 
 
0,501  * 
 
0,338 
   
0,558 
   
0,331 
                                    Attended college  -0,46450 
   
-0,57045 
   
0,12581 
   
-0,31124 
   
0,06440 
   
 
0,140  *** 
 
0,246  ** 
 
0,284 
   
0,240 
   
0,160 
   
 
0,143  *** 
 
0,286  ** 
 
0,180 
   
0,331 
   
0,173 
                                    Work experience abroad  0,00683 
   
0,03649 
   
-0,02124 
   
0,02067 
   
-0,01522 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,012 
   
0,014  *** 
 
0,017 
   
0,013 
   




   
0,015  ** 
 
0,012  * 
 
0,017 
   
0,011 
                                    Work experience abroad  -0,00009 
   
-0,00024 
   
0,00027 
   
-0,00002 
   
0,00022 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                                                    Last left the country   -0,02809 
   
0,03081 
   
0,01369 
   
0,03940 
   
0,02043 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,018 
   
0,022 
   
0,026 
   
0,020  * 
 
0,018 
   
 
0,016  * 
 
0,025 
   
0,021 
   
0,026 
   
0,020 
                                    Last left the country   0,00045 
   
-0,00007 
   
-0,00042 
   
-0,00024 
   
-0,00047 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
 
 
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
                                  Type of visa 
                              (Dummy base category: Working visa) 
                            Immigrant visa  -0,09763 
   
0,11283 
   
-0,23206 
   
0,37409 
   
-0,20899 
   
 
0,364 
   
0,493 
   
0,377 
   
0,379 
   
0,254 
   
 
0,405 
   
1,982 
   
0,270 
   
2,177 
   
0,264 
                                    Other visa  0,34983 
   
-0,50737 
   
0,41200 
   
-0,76650 
   
0,17985 
   
 
0,422 
   
0,395 
   
0,543 
   
0,379  ** 
 
0,357 
   
 
0,337 
   
0,665 
   
0,446 
   
0,676 
   
0,401 
                                    Kind of work in host country 
                              (Dummy base category: Unskilled worker) 
                            Other occupations  -0,30106 
   
-0,47964 
   
0,05781 
   
-0,37813 
   
-0,00037 
   
 
0,127  ** 
 
0,183  *** 
 
0,218 
   
0,186  ** 
 
0,136 
   
 
0,125  ** 
 
0,215  ** 
 
0,152 
   
0,229  * 
 
0,145 
                                    Charateristics of host country 
                              By income 
                              (Dummy base category: High income country) 
                            Lower middle-income country  0,11585 
   
0,15919 
   
-0,39926 
   
-0,03586 
   
-0,37104 
    
0,350 
   
0,372 
   
0,376 
   
0,307 
   
0,245 
   
 
0,347 
   
0,847 
   
0,297 
   
0,855 
   
0,278 
                                    Upper middle-income country  0,09622 
   
0,32523 
   
-0,01864 
   
0,18407 
   
0,02990 
   
 
0,167 
   
0,180  * 
 
0,202 
   
0,159 
   
0,131 
   
 
0,179 
   
0,187  * 
 
0,153 
   
0,209 
   
0,146 
                                    By location 
                              (Dummy base category: In Asia and the Pacific) 
                          In the Middle East  0,29101 
   
0,14289 
   
-0,36316 
   
0,08231 
   
-0,35533 
   
 
0,157  * 
 
0,194 
   
0,202  * 
 
0,193 
   
0,149  ** 
 
 
0,166  * 
 
0,219 
   
0,159  ** 
 
0,222 
   
0,157  ** 
                                  In Africa, Eastern   0,81362 
   
0,75229 
   
0,23444 
   
-0,03996 
   
0,20271 
    and Central Europe  0,779 
   
0,926 
   
0,924 
   
0,627 
   
0,417 
   
 
0,578 
   
2,934 
   
0,491 
   
3,424 
   
0,468 
                                                                    In America and Western Europe  0,18048 
   
0,52000 
   
0,02837 
   
0,39604 
   
0,08970 
   
 
0,171 
   
0,211  ** 
 
0,230 
   
0,200  ** 
 
0,123 
   
 
0,170 
   
0,245  ** 
 
0,151 
   
0,247 
   
0,141 
                                    Characteristics of origin household 
                            Asset income  0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                                    Male household head  -0,08915 
   
-0,22830 
   
-0,02119 
   
-0,18516 
   
-0,05298 
   
 
0,126 
   
0,142 
   
0,147 
   
0,136 
   
0,091 
   
 
0,125 
   
0,166 
   
0,100 
   
0,165 
   
0,097 
                                    Age in years of the household  0,00369 
   
0,00476 
   
-0,05455 
   
0,02942 
   
-0,05218 
    head  0,034 
   
0,039 
   
0,036 
   
0,030 
   




   
0,042 
   
0,026  ** 
 
0,044 
   
0,026  ** 
                                  Age in years of the household  -0,00016 
   
-0,00014 
   
0,00051 
   
-0,00028 
   
0,00049 
    head squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   




   
0,000 
   
0,000  ** 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  ** 
                                  Number of household members   -0,01624 
   
0,01501 
   
0,10649 
   
0,02134 
   
0,10858 
    14 years and younger  0,041 
   
0,045 
   
0,043  ** 
 
0,047 
   




   
0,057 
   
0,034  *** 
 
0,059 
   
0,033  *** 
                                  Number of household members   0,17230 
   
0,19841 
   
-0,06062 
   
0,10945 
   
-0,03960 
    between 15 and 24 years old  0,045  *** 
 
0,089  ** 
 
0,100 
   
0,088 
   
0,062 
   
 
0,042  *** 
 
0,097  ** 
 
0,068 
   
0,114 
   
0,067 
                                    Number of household members   0,39687 
   
0,42215 
   
-0,25543 
   
0,30722 
   
-0,20538 
    25 years and older  0,045  *** 
 
0,169  ** 
 
0,198 
   
0,168  * 
 
0,124  * 
 
 
0,042  *** 
 
0,193  ** 
 
0,141  * 
 
0,209 
   
0,139 
                                    (Dummy base category: Resides in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon) 
              Resides in the rest of Luzon  -0,33481 
   
-0,58229 
   
0,19790 
   
-0,33806 
   
0,14598 
   
 
0,211 




   
0,333 
   
0,240 





   
0,262 
   
0,410 
   
0,258 
                                    Resides in the Visayas  -0,58680 
   
-0,91178 
   
0,55573 
   
-0,65225 
   
0,45341 







   
0,323  ** 
 







0,265  ** 
 
0,413 
   
0,256  * 
                                  Resides in Mindanao  -1,06414 
   
-1,20700 
   
0,06507 
   
-0,69785 
   
-0,05245 






   
0,436 
   
0,306 







   
0,564 
   
0,347 
                                    Constant  12,32214 
   
11,08637 
   
6,07014 
   
6,01389 
   
6,66097 







   
4,617 
   







3,502  * 
 
5,943 
   
3,503  * 
                                             
                                ρεu    -0,90854 
                           
 
0,047  *** 
                         
 
0,513  * 
                                                          σu  1,06212 
                           
 
0,044  +++ 
                         
 
0,075  +++ 
                                                          σεu 
           
-1,54308 
                (coefficient of inverse Mills' ratio λ) 
         
0,851  * 
             
             
0,631  ** 
                                                      
       
       
       
       
  
R
2  0,271 
                            Log Pseudo Likelihood Function 
                 
-1296,179 
          Number of observations  875 
   
875 
   
735 
   
875 
   
735 
                                               
Note: 
                              The numbers below the coefficient/parameter estimates are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. The first is generated 
from one regression run based on the applicable sample; the second from bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications. 
                                *   (+)   -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.1. 
                        **  (++)  -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.05. 
                      *** (+++) -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.01. 
                       Table 2a : Descriptive Statistics of Variables for All Overseas Workers 





















Error  Min  Max    
                          Remittance indicator 
 
0,86579  0,341  0,008  0  1 
            ln (Amount remitted) 
             
11,17969  2,928  1,028  6,21461 14,57632 
                          Characteristics of overseas worker 
                        Household head or spouse 
 
0,46555  0,499  0,012  0  1 
 
0,48374  0,500  0,013  0  1 
Son or daughter  
 
0,05273  0,224  0,005  0  1 
 
0,04983  0,218  0,006  0  1 
Son- or daughter-in-law 
 
0,41642  0,493  0,012  0  1 
 
0,40692  0,491  0,013  0  1 
Grandson or granddaughter 
 
0,05812  0,234  0,006  0  1 
 
0,05329  0,225  0,006  0  1 
Other relative and non relative 
 
0,00539  0,073  0,002  0  1 
 
0,00484  0,069  0,002  0  1 
                          Male 
 
0,44398  0,497  0,012  0  1 
 
0,45052  0,498  0,013  0  1 
                          Married 
 
0,58598  0,493  0,012  0  1 
 
0,59862  0,490  0,012  0  1 
                          Age in years
a 
 
35,10365  9,268  0,218  17  84 
 
35,44498  9,257  0,233  17  84 
                          Attended grade school 
 
0,01019  0,100  0,002  0  1 
 
0,00900  0,094  0,002  0  1 
Grade school graduate 
 
0,03595  0,186  0,004  0  1 
 
0,03668  0,188  0,005  0  1 
Attended high school 
 
0,06171  0,241  0,006  0  1 
 
0,05536  0,229  0,006  0  1 
High school graduate 
 
0,27262  0,445  0,011  0  1 
 
0,27682  0,448  0,012  0  1 
Attended post-secondary school 
 
0,04254  0,202  0,005  0  1 
 
0,04152  0,200  0,005  0  1 
Attended college 
 
0,25285  0,435  0,011  0  1 
 
0,25398  0,435  0,011  0  1 
College graduate  
 
0,32355  0,468  0,012  0  1 
 
0,32664  0,469  0,012  0  1 
                          Work experience abroad (in months)
b 
 
28,79389  18,316  0,448  0  96 
 
29,99723  18,411  0,489  0  96 
                          Last left the country (in months)
b 
 
43,18814  14,036  0,349  0  59 
 
44,25675  12,951  0,354  0  59 
                          Type of visa 
                        Immigrant visa 
 
0,02636  0,160  0,004  0  1 
 
0,02768  0,164  0,004  0  1 
Working visa 
 
0,95446  0,209  0,005  0  1 
 
0,95848  0,200  0,005  0  1 
Other visa 
 
0,01917  0,137  0,003  0  1 
 
0,01384  0,117  0,003  0  1 
                          Kind of work in host country 
                        Corporate executive, manager, or 
proprietor 
 
0,02097  0,143  0,004  0  1 
 
0,02076  0,143  0,004  0  1 
Professional 
 
0,08328  0,276  0,007  0  1 
 
0,09066  0,287  0,008  0  1 
Technician or associate professional 
 
0,08089  0,273  0,006  0  1 
 
0,07543  0,264  0,007  0  1 
Clerk 
 
0,03295  0,179  0,004  0  1 
 
0,03114  0,174  0,004  0  1 
Service or sales workers 
 
0,10605  0,308  0,007  0  1 
 
0,10727  0,310  0,008  0  1 
Farmer, forestry worker, or 
fisherman 
 
0,00419  0,065  0,002  0  1 
 
0,00346  0,059  0,002  0  1 
Tradesman or related worker 
 
0,13960  0,347  0,009  0  1 
 
0,14325  0,350  0,009  0  1 
Plant & machine operator or 
assembler 
 
0,14200  0,349  0,008  0  1 
 
0,14048  0,348  0,009  0  1 
Special occupation 
 
0,00479  0,069  0,002  0  1 
 
0,00415  0,064  0,002  0  1 
Unskilled worker 
 
0,38526  0,487  0,012  0  1 
 
0,38339  0,486  0,013  0  1 
                         Charateristics of host country 
                        By income 
                        High income country 
 
0,65249  0,476  0,011  0  1 
 
0,65398  0,476  0,012  0  1 
Low income country 
 
0,00419  0,065  0,002  0  1 
 
0,00415  0,064  0,002  0  1 
Lower middle-income country 
 
0,02576  0,158  0,004  0  1 
 
0,02491  0,156  0,004  0  1 
Upper middle-income country 
 
0,30377  0,460  0,011  0  1 
 
0,30242  0,459  0,012  0  1 
Other income country  
 
0,01378  0,117  0,002  0  1 
 
0,00623  0,079  0,002  0  1 
                          By location 
                        In the Middle East 
 
0,35470  0,479  0,012  0  1 
 
0,35433  0,478  0,013  0  1 
In America and Western Europe 
 
0,17975  0,384  0,009  0  1 
 
0,19031  0,393  0,011  0  1 
In South Asia, East Asia, and the 
Pacific 
 
0,45596  0,498  0,012  0  1 
 
0,44637  0,497  0,013  0  1 
In Africa, Eastern and Central 
Europe  
 
0,00959  0,097  0,002  0  1 
 
0,00900  0,094  0,003  0  1 
                          Characteristics of origin household 
                        ln (Labor income) 
 
10,30880  1,848  0,044  3,40120  14,30262 
 
10,20753  1,865  0,050  3,40120 14,30262 
                          Asset income 
 
3365,92 27065,760  673,695  0  703000 
 
3055,81 23344,500  611,936  0  703000 
                          Male household head 
 
0,67825  0,467  0,011  0  1 
 
0,65675  0,475  0,012  0  1 
                          Age in years of the household head 
 
50,24086  13,414  0,331  17  95 
 
50,12526  13,484  0,350  17  95 
                          Number of household members 14 years 
and younger 
 
1,46854  1,346  0,033  0  7 
 
1,47474  1,341  0,034  0  7 
Number of household members between 
15 and 24 years old 
 
1,10186  1,238  0,030  0  7 
 
1,10934  1,235  0,031  0  7 
Number of household members 25 years 
and older 
 
2,38946  1,268  0,031  1  8 
 
2,33702  1,273  0,033  1  8 
                          Resides in the rest of Luzon 
 
0,28400  0,451  0,012  0  1 
 
0,29619  0,457  0,013  0  1 
Resides in the Visayas 
 
0,16177  0,368  0,009  0  1 
 
0,16194  0,369  0,010  0  1 
Resides in Mindanao 
 
0,17256  0,378  0,009  0  1 
 
0,16471  0,371  0,010  0  1 
Resides in NCR CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, 
Central Luzon 
 
0,38167  0,486  0,012  0  1 
 
0,37716  0,485  0,013  0  1 
                          Number of observations 
   
1669 
         
1445 
      Note: 
aSample includes overseas family members who are immigrants and may be older than the working age contract worker. 
bAlthough the question asks for family members who are abroad in the past five years since October 1998, we believe that respondents 
interpreted it as number of years the migrant has been working abroad or has been away since his first overseas contract and thus may exceed 5 
years. 
 
   
    
Table 2b : Descriptive Statistics of Variables for  Overseas Workers who are Heads or Spouses of Heads of Households  





















Error  Min  Max       
                          Remittance indicator 
 
0,89817  0,303  0,011  0  1 
            ln (Amount remitted) 
             
11,47361  1,004  0,038 7,09008 14,57632 
                          Characteristics of overseas worker 
                        Male 
 
0,55744  0,497  0,018  0  1 
 
0,57267  0,495  0,019  0  1 
                          Married 
 
0,98303  0,129  0,005  0  1 
 
0,98837  0,107  0,004  0  1 
                          Age in years 
 
40,11227  8,153  0,298  22  68 
 
40,18895  8,043  0,302  22  68 
                          Attended grade school 
 
0,01305  0,114  0,004  0  1 
 
0,01163  0,107  0,004  0  1 
Grade school graduate 
 
0,04830  0,215  0,008  0  1 
 
0,04942  0,217  0,008  0  1 
Attended high school 
 
0,07441  0,263  0,009  0  1 
 
0,06250  0,242  0,010  0  1 
High school graduate 
 
0,31332  0,464  0,017  0  1 
 
0,31686  0,466  0,017  0  1 
Attended post-secondary school 
 
0,04047  0,197  0,007  0  1 
 
0,03924  0,194  0,007  0  1 
Attended college 
 
0,22585  0,418  0,015  0  1 
 
0,23110  0,422  0,015  0  1 
College graduate  
 
0,28460  0,452  0,017  0  1 
 
0,28924  0,454  0,017  0  1 
                          Work experience abroad (in months)  
 
31,65796  18,314  0,670  0  96 
 
32,62645  18,319  0,714  0  96 
                          Last left the country (in months) 
 
42,60705  14,427  0,531  0  59 
 
44,21221  13,027  0,490  1  59 
                          Type of visa 
                        Immigrant visa 
 
0,02480  0,156  0,005  0  1 
 
0,02616  0,160  0,006  0  1 
Working visa 
 
0,95431  0,209  0,007  0  1 
 
0,95785  0,201  0,008  0  1 
Other visa 
 
0,02089  0,143  0,005  0  1 
 
0,01599  0,126  0,005  0  1 
                         
                         Kind of work in host country 
                        Corporate executive, manager, or 
proprietor 
 
0,02742  0,163  0,006  0  1 
 
0,02616  0,160  0,006  0  1 
Professional 
 
0,05483  0,228  0,008  0  1 
 
0,05814  0,234  0,009  0  1 
Technician or associate professional 
 
0,06919  0,254  0,009  0  1 
 
0,05959  0,237  0,009  0  1 
Clerk 
 
0,01828  0,134  0,005  0  1 
 
0,01890  0,136  0,005  0  1 
Service or sales workers 
 
0,10966  0,313  0,011  0  1 
 
0,11483  0,319  0,012  0  1 
Tradesman or related worker 
 
0,19582  0,397  0,015  0  1 
 
0,19767  0,399  0,015  0  1 
Plant & machine operator or 
assembler 
 
0,17232  0,378  0,014  0  1 
 
0,17442  0,380  0,015  0  1 
Unskilled workers  
 
0,35248  0,478  0,017  0  1 
 
0,35029  0,477  0,018  0  1 
                          Charateristics of host country 
                        By income 
                        Lower middle-income country 
 
0,02219  0,147  0,005  0  1 
 
0,02180  0,146  0,006  0  1 
Upper middle-income country 
 
0,34987  0,477  0,017  0  1 
 
0,34884  0,477  0,019  0  1 
High income country 
 
0,61358  0,487  0,018  0  1 
 
0,61337  0,487  0,019  0  1 
                          By location 
                        In the Middle East 
 
0,40601  0,491  0,017  0  1 
 
0,41134  0,492  0,019  0  1 
In America and Western Europe 
 
0,18538  0,389  0,014  0  1 
 
0,19622  0,397  0,015  0  1 
In South Asia, East Asia, and the 
Pacific 
 
0,39687  0,490  0,018  0  1 
 
0,38227  0,486  0,019  0  1 
In Africa, Eastern and Central 
Europe  
 
0,01175  0,108  0,004  0  1 
 
0,01017  0,100  0,004  0  1 
                          Characteristics of origin household 
                        ln (Labor income)  
 
10,17543  1,931  0,072 3,951 13,95160 
 
10,09079  1,948  0,074 3,95124 13,95160 
                          Asset income 
 
2776,76 15399,170 552,995  0  240480 
 
2820,21 16016,060 605,057  0  240480 
                          Male household head 
 
0,63577  0,482  0,017  0  1 
 
0,60901  0,488  0,019  0  1 
                          Age in years of the household head 
 
41,15274  8,718  0,309  23  87 
 
41,17733  8,637  0,322  23  87 
                          Number of household members 14 years 
and younger 
 
1,65796  1,307  0,048  0  7 
 
1,63954  1,290  0,049  0  7 
Number of household members between 
15 and 24 years old 
 
1,02480  1,240  0,044  0  7 
 
1,05378  1,233  0,048  0  7 Number of household members 25 years 
and older 
 
1,74021  0,873  0,032  1  7 
 
1,69767  0,878  0,033  1  7 
                          Resides in the rest of Luzon 
 
0,31071  0,463  0,016  0  1 
 
0,31541  0,465  0,017  0  1 
Resides in the Visayas 
 
0,14099  0,348  0,012  0  1 
 
0,14680  0,354  0,013  0  1 
Resides in Mindanao 
 
0,12010  0,325  0,012  0  1 
 
0,11773  0,323  0,012  0  1 
Resides in NCR CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, 
Central Luzon  
 
0,42820  0,495  0,018  0  1 
 
0,42006  0,494  0,019  0  1 
                          Number of observations 
     
766 
         
688 
   
                         
    
Table 2c : Descriptive Statistics of Variables for  Overseas Workers who are neither Heads nor Spouses of Heads of Households  
Variable 




















Min  Max 
           
Remittance 
indicator    0,84000 ***  0,367  0,013  0  1 
              ln (Amount 
remitted)   
             
10,89747 ***  1,063  0,039  6,21461  13,75364 
                              Characteristics 
of overseas 
worker                             
Son or daughter     0,10057 
 




0,297  0,011  0  1 
Son- or 
daughter-in-law    0,77714 
 




0,409  0,015  0  1 
Grandson or 
granddaughter    0,10857 
 




0,303  0,011  0  1 
Other relative    0,01029 
 




0,097  0,011  0  1 
Male    0,33600 ***  0,473  0,016  0  1 
 
0,32653 ***  0,469  0,017  0  1 
Married 
 
0,24000 ***  0,427  0,014  0  1 
 
0,23129 ***  0,422  0,015  0  1 
Age in years    30,77371 ***  7,895  0,262  17  84 
 
31,01905 ***  8,051  0,306  17  84 
                              Attended grade 
school    0,00686 
 




0,074  0,003  0  1 
Grade school 
graduate    0,02514 **  0,157  0,005  0  1 
 
0,02585 **  0,159  0,006  0  1 
Attended high 




0,216  0,008  0  1 
High school 
graduate    0,23886 ***  0,427  0,015  0  1 
 
0,24218 ***  0,429  0,016  0  1 
Attended post-
secondary school    0,04571 
 




0,207  0,008  0  1 
Attended college    0,27429 **  0,446  0,015  0  1 
 
0,27211 *  0,445  0,016  0  1 
College graduate    0,35657 ***  0,479  0,016  0  1 
 
0,36054 ***  0,480  0,018  0  1 
                              Work experience 
abroad (in 
months from)    26,38857 ***  17,973  0,622  0  75 
 










12,972  0,489  0  59 



























0,110  0,004  0  1 
                              Kind of work in 
host country                             
Unskilled worker 
 
0,42629 ***  0,495  0,017  0  1 
 










0,495  0,018  0  1 
                              Charateristics 
of host country                             














0,26971 ***  0,444  0,015  0  1 
 




0,69371 ***  0,461  0,016  0  1 
 
0,70068 ***  0,458  0,017  0  1 
                              By location                             
In the Middle 
East 
 
0,31543 ***  0,465  0,016  0  1 
 
0,30476 ***  0,461  0,017  0  1 









0,391  0,014  0  1 
In South Asia, 
East Asia, and 
the Pacific 
 
0,50171 ***  0,500  0,017  0  1 
 
0,50204 ***  0,500  0,019  0  1 
In Africa, 
Eastern and 








0,074  0,003  0  1 
                              Characteristics 
of origin 




10,43077 ***  1,757  0,060  3  14 
 








27799,310  1027,940  0  703000 
                              Male household 
head 
 
0,72114 ***  0,449  0,015  0  1 
 
0,70748 ***  0,455  0,016  0  1 




58,12800 ***  11,716  0,383  17  95 
 
58,47347 ***  11,764  0,430  17  95 
                              Number of 
household 
members 14 years 
and younger 




15 and 24 years 
old 
  1,17257 **  1,235  0,041  0  7   1,16599 *  1,234  0,048  0  7 
Number of 
household 
members 25 years 
and older 
  2,95886 ***  1,286  0,041  1  8   2,94014 ***  1,293  0,046  1  8 
                              Resides in the 
rest of Luzon 
 




0,448  0,016  0  1 
Resides in the 
Visayas 
 








0,21600 ***  0,412  0,014  0  1 
 
0,20544 ***  0,404  0,014  0  1 





0,34743 ***  0,476  0,016  0  1 
 
0,34286 ***  0,475  0,018  0  1 
                              Number of 
observations 
        875             735    
Note :    
*-- different from the mean of overseas workers who are heads and spouses of heads at two-tailed α = 0.1. 
**-- different from the mean of overseas workers who are heads and spouses of heads at two-tailed α = 0.05. 
***-- different from the mean of overseas workers who are heads and spouses of heads at two-tailed α = 0.01. 




   

















                      All overseas workers 
                                                  Tropical cyclone occurrences  -0,06956 
                     
 
0,024  *** 
                   
 
0,024  *** 
                                              Provincial employment rate  -0,0262 
                     
 
0,013  ** 
                   
 
0,014  * 
                                              Predicted residual 


























                            Heads or spouses of heads 
                                                  Tropical cyclone occurrences  -0,08174 
                     
 
0,037  ** 
                   
 
0,039  ** 
                                              Provincial employment rate  -0,038 
                     
 
0,022  * 
                   
 
0,024 
                                                Predicted residual 


























                            Neither heads nor spouses of heads 
                                                Tropical cyclone occurrences  -0,06176 
                     
 
0,033  * 
                   
 
0,029  ** 
                                              Provincial employment rate  -0,02007 
                     
 
0,016 
                     
 
0,016 
                                                Predicted residual 









       
0,402  **  0,465 
   
0,41 
 
0,298  ** 
       




0,33  * 
                                      
Excerpted from Appendix Table 1. 
                                               Note: 
                        The numbers below the coefficient/parameter estimates are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. 
The first is generated from one regression run based on the applicable sample; the second from 
bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications. 
*   -- significant at two-tailed α = 0.1. 
                      **  -- significant at two-tailed α = 0.05. 
                    *** -- significant at two-tailed α = 0.01. 
                     Table 4a : Factors affecting the Incidence and Amount of Remittances, All Overseas Workers 
                                      
Variable  Heckman's Selection (Two-step)  Heckman's Selection (ML) 









                            Characteristics of overseas worker 
                                                (Dummy base category: Son or daughter) 
                      Household head or spouse  0,23809 
   
0,09420 
   
0,20165 
   
0,10446 
   
 
0,245 
   
0,141 
   
0,241 
   
0,146 
   
 
0,264 
   
0,147 
   
0,261 
   
0,146 
                              Son- or daughter-in-law  -0,33825 
   
-0,18350 
   
-0,33130 
   
-0,19394 
   
 
0,217 
   
0,140 
   
0,217 
   
0,150 
   
 
0,239 
   
0,154 
   
0,243 
   
0,151 
                              Grandson or granddaughter  -0,12322 
   
0,13901 
   
-0,30105 
   
0,11481 
   
 
0,540 
   
0,362 
   
0,547 
   
0,249 
   
 
1,992 
   
0,289 
   
2,411 
   
0,271 
                              Other relative and non-relative  -0,13507 
   
-0,53403 
   
-0,09005 
   
-0,52746 
   
 
0,249 
   
0,154  *** 
 
0,256 
   




   
0,184  *** 
 
0,264 
   
0,183  *** 
                            Male  -0,12097 
   
0,16634 
   
-0,16492 
   
0,15575 
   
 
0,125 
   
0,074  ** 
 
0,115 
   




   
0,075  ** 
 
0,127 
   
0,075  ** 
                            Married  0,11142 
   
0,12250 
   
0,09841 
   
0,12654 
   
 
0,163 
   
0,098 
   
0,167 
   
0,104 
   
 
0,185 
   
0,105 
   
0,188 
   
0,104 
                              Age in years  0,01945 
   
0,00734 
   
0,01076 
   
0,00824 
   
 
0,035 
   
0,019 
   
0,034 
   
0,018 
   
 
0,038 
   
0,020 
   
0,038 
   
0,020 
                                                                                  Age in years squared  -0,00028 
   
0,00001 
   
-0,00015 
   
-0,00001 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
    (Dummy base category: College graduate) 
                      Attended grade school  -0,31630 
   
-0,58356 
   
-0,32266 
   
-0,60628 
   
 
0,374 
   
0,265  ** 
 
0,362 
   




   
0,258  ** 
 
1,025 
   
0,242  ** 
                            Grade school graduate  -0,18716 
   
-0,55779 
   
-0,21145 
   
-0,56526 
   
 
0,259 
   
0,144  *** 
 
0,278 
   




   
0,140  *** 
 
0,305 
   
0,138  *** 
                            Attended high school  -0,49279 
   
-0,32126 
   
-0,45793 
   
-0,33761 
   
 
0,188  *** 
 
0,126  ** 
 
0,217  ** 
 
0,136  ** 
 
 
0,204  ** 
 
0,132  ** 
 
0,210  ** 
 
0,130  *** 
                            High school graduate  -0,05053 
   
-0,30585 
   
-0,08532 
   
-0,30897 
   
 
0,132 
   
0,074  *** 
 
0,125 
   




   
0,072  *** 
 
0,136 
   
0,071  *** 
                            Attended post-secondary school  -0,26813 
   
-0,26422 
   
-0,15910 
   
-0,26327 
   
 
0,219 
   
0,133  ** 
 
0,268 
   
0,165 
   
 
0,240 
   
0,167 
   
0,256 
   
0,167 
                              Attended college  0,01952 
   
-0,20378 
   
0,00608 
   
-0,20463 
   
 
0,126 
   
0,071  *** 
 
0,122 
   
0,071  *** 
  
0,131 
   
0,072  *** 
 
0,131 
   
0,071  *** 
                            Work experience abroad  0,02463 
   
0,01005 
   
0,01918 
   
0,01064 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,010  ** 
 
0,006  * 
 
0,012 
   
0,006  * 
 
 
0,011  ** 
 
0,006  * 
 
0,012 
   
0,006  * 
                            Work experience abroad  -0,00004 
   
-0,00006 
   
0,00003 
   
-0,00006 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                              Last left the country   0,06091 
   
0,01245 
   
0,05954 
   
0,01506 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,013  *** 
 
0,012 
   
0,015  *** 
 
0,017 
   
 
0,014  *** 
 
0,013 
   
0,014  *** 
 
0,015 
                              Last left the country   -0,00047 
   
-0,00019 
   
-0,00048 
   
-0,00022 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000  ** 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  ** 
 
0,000 
   
 
0,000  ** 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  ** 
 
0,000 
                              Type of visa 
                        (Dummy base category: Working visa) 
                      Immigrant visa  0,04699 
   
-0,27785 
   
0,25992 
   
-0,27001 
   
 
0,355 
   
0,164  * 
 
0,424 
   
0,175 
   
 
0,818 
   
0,180 
   
0,897 
   
0,180 
                              Other visa  -0,74309 
   
0,08512 
   
-0,73899 
   
0,05526 
   
 
0,271  *** 
 
0,228 
   
0,260  *** 
 
0,260 
   
 
0,302  ** 
 
0,282 
   
0,304  ** 
 
0,263 
                              Kind of work in host country 
                        (Dummy base category: Unskilled worker 
                      Special occupation  -0,15203 
   
0,14078 
   
-0,18958 
   
0,15877 
   
 
0,626 
   
0,381 
   
0,565 
   
0,372 
   
 
1,965 
   
0,427 
   
5,027 
   
0,421 
                              Corporate executive, manager,   0,15288 
   
0,58245 
   
0,09486 
   
0,58327 
    or proprietor  0,334 
   
0,185  *** 
 
0,359 
   




   
0,156  *** 
 
0,699 
   
0,153  *** 
                            Professional  0,69916 
   
0,30204 
   
0,65929 
   
0,31685 
   
 
0,222  *** 
 
0,113  *** 
 
0,238  *** 
 
0,125  ** 
 
 
0,254  *** 
 
0,117  ** 
 
0,261  ** 
 
0,118  *** 
                            Technician or associate  -0,04157 
   
0,40299 
   
0,01373 
   
0,40374 
    professional  0,169 
   
0,106  *** 
 
0,178 
   




   
0,106  *** 
 
0,187 
   
0,106  *** 
                            Clerk  -0,12481 
   
0,05939 
   
-0,10635 
   
0,06333 
   
 
0,251 
   
0,151 
   
0,215 
   
0,157 
   
 
0,232 
   
0,167 
   
0,233 
   
0,166 
                              Service or sales workers  0,11515 
   
0,23005 
   
0,15261 
   
0,23593 
   
 
0,165 
   
0,090  ** 
 
0,164 
   




   
0,088  *** 
 
0,177 
   
0,087  *** 
                            Farmer, forestry worker,   -1,19593 
   
-0,09051 
   
-1,11941 
   
-0,13744 
    or fisherman  0,551  ** 
 
0,428 
   
0,575  * 
 
0,443 
   
 
2,326 
   
0,495 
   
2,795 
   
0,487 
                              Tradesman or related worker  0,11822 
   
0,15840 
   
0,15701 
   
0,16360 
   
 
0,172 
   
0,095  * 
 
0,160 
   




   
0,095  * 
 
0,171 
   
0,094  * 
                            Plant & machine operator or  -0,10625 
   
0,24027 
   
-0,07934 
   
0,24029 
   assembler  0,167 
   
0,097  ** 
 
0,154 
   




   
0,097  ** 
 
0,173 
   
0,096  ** 
                            Charateristics of host country 
                        By income 
                        (Dummy base category: High income country) 
                      Low income country  -0,21119 
   
0,50599 
   
-0,32218 
   
0,49999 
   
 
0,678 
   
0,398 
   
0,548 
   
0,331 
   
 
2,798 
   
0,384 
   
3,515 
   
0,374 
                              Lower middle-income country  -0,07348 
   
-0,08068 
   
-0,00935 
   
-0,07265 
   
 
0,297 
   
0,170 
   
0,314 
   
0,173 
   
 
0,381 
   
0,182 
   
0,387 
   
0,180 
                              Upper middle-income country  -0,06076 
   
0,16876 
   
-0,05511 
   
0,16694 
   
 
0,136 
   
0,079  ** 
 
0,135 
   




   
0,081  ** 
 
0,145 
   
0,079  ** 
                                                      Other income country  0,31716 
   
0,56474 
   
0,24925 
   
0,57368 
   
 
0,445 
   
0,215  *** 
 
0,407 
   




   
0,198  *** 
 
2,401 
   
0,194  *** 
  By location 
                        (Dummy base category: In Asia and the Pacific) 
                    In Africa, Eastern   -0,15661 
   
0,41215 
   
-0,37603 
   
0,39163 
    and Central Europe  0,495 
   
0,286 
   
0,501 
   




   
0,210  ** 
 
1,329 
   
0,205  * 
                            In the Middle East  0,10213 
   
-0,24212 
   
0,11223 
   
-0,23740 
   
 
0,130 
   
0,077  *** 
 
0,132 
   




   
0,085  *** 
 
0,149 
   
0,082  *** 
                            In America and Western Europe  0,36468 
   
0,28386 
   
0,38024 
   
0,29497 
   
 
0,157  ** 
 
0,084  *** 
 
0,170  ** 
 
0,082  *** 
 
 
0,177  ** 
 
0,076  *** 
 
0,180  ** 
 
0,076  *** 
                            Characteristics of origin household 
                      Labor income (Log)  -0,16683 
   
-0,00340 
   
-0,14989 
   
-0,00656 
   
 
0,032  *** 
 
0,018 
   
0,058  ** 
 
0,022 
   
 
0,039  *** 
 
0,018 
   
0,044  *** 
 
0,019 
                              Asset income  0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                              Male household head  -0,29933 
   
-0,15526 
   
-0,29987 
   
-0,16780 
   
 
0,110  *** 
 
0,063  ** 
 
0,111  *** 
 
0,063  *** 
 
 
0,122  ** 
 
0,065  ** 
 
0,122  ** 
 
0,064  *** 
                            Age in years of the household  -0,00766 
   
-0,00368 
   
-0,00686 
   
-0,00395 
    head  0,026 
   
0,014 
   
0,023 
   
0,015 
   
 
0,026 
   
0,016 
   
0,026 
   
0,016 
                              Age in years of the household  0,00010 
   
-0,00001 
   
0,00010 
   
-0,00001 
    head squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                              Number of household members   0,02806 
   
0,07623 
   
0,02602 
   
0,07755 
    14 years and younger  0,035 
   
0,020  *** 
 
0,039 
   




   
0,021  *** 
 
0,039 
   
0,020  *** 
                            Number of household members   0,08054 
   
0,06578 
   
0,06110 
   
0,06748 
   between 15 and 24 years old  0,039  ** 
 
0,022  *** 
 
0,040 
   
0,023  *** 
 
 
0,041  ** 
 
0,024  *** 
 
0,042 
   
0,024  *** 
                            Number of household members   -0,00474 
   
0,02153 
   
0,02699 
   
0,02373 
    25 years and older  0,044 
   
0,025 
   
0,053 
   
0,029 
   
 
0,044 
   
0,030 
   
0,049 
   
0,029 
                              (Dummy base category: Resides in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon) 
          Resides in the rest of Luzon  0,11663 
   
-0,20534 
   
0,13912 
   
-0,19947 
   
 
0,122 
   
0,066  *** 
 
0,120 
   




   
0,066  *** 
 
0,129 
   
0,066  *** 
                            Resides in the Visayas  -0,18253 
   
0,00731 
   
-0,15569 
   
0,00505 
   
 
0,138 
   
0,078 
   
0,136 
   
0,077 
   
 
0,147 
   
0,073 
   
0,147 
   
0,073 
                              Resides in Mindanao  -0,20303 
   
-0,50379 
   
-0,15474 
   
-0,50829 
   
 
0,129 
   
0,080  *** 
 
0,166 
   




   
0,088  *** 
 
0,137 
   
0,087  *** 
                            Constant  0,54555 
   
10,79206 
   
0,54052 
   
10,70289 
   
 
1,011 
   
0,597  *** 
 
0,934 
   




   
0,679  *** 
 
1,031 
   
0,681  *** 
          
        
        
        
  
                          ρεu 
           
-0,66607 
         
             
0,391  * 
       
             
0,377  * 
                                  σu 
           
0,92214 
         
             
0,079  +++ 
       
             
0,048  +++ 
                                  σεu 
     
-0,74462 
                (coefficient of inverse Mills' ratio λ) 
   
0,325  ** 
             
       
0,374  ** 
              Log Pseudo Likelihood Function 
           
-2370,428 
          Number of observations  1669 
   
1445 
   
1669 
   
1445 
    Note : The numbers below the coefficient/parameter estimates are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. The first is generated from 
one regression run based on the applicable sample; the second from bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications. 
*   (+)   -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.1. 
**  (++)  -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.05. 
*** (+++) -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.01. 
 
    
Table 4b : Factors affecting the Incidence and Amount of Remittances, Overseas Workers who are Heads  or Spouses of Heads of 
Households      
        
Variable  Heckman's Selection (Two step)  Heckman's Selection (ML) 









                                          
Characteristics of overseas worker 
                      Male  0,23409 
   
0,23174 
   
0,23138 
   
0,23867 
   
 
0,277 
   
0,115  ** 
 
0,247 
   




   
0,122  * 
 
0,375 
   
0,121  ** 
                            Married  1,51202 
   
0,62358 
   
1,51097 
   
0,70693 
   
 
0,464  *** 
 
0,314  ** 
 
0,457  *** 
 
0,371  * 
 
 
0,881  * 
 
0,410 
   
0,909  * 
 
0,402  * 
                            Age in years  -0,05450 
   
0,01727 
   
-0,05579 
   
0,01592 
   
 
0,101 
   
0,041 
   
0,099 
   
0,047 
   
 
0,150 
   
0,051 
   
0,156 
   
0,051 
                              Age in years squared  0,00041 
   
-0,00021 
   
0,00042 
   
-0,00020 
   
 
0,001 
   
0,000 
   
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
 
0,002 
   
0,001 
   
0,002 
   
0,001 
                              (Dummy base category: College graduate) 
                      Attended grade school  -0,51720 
   
-0,63458 
   
-0,50641 
   
-0,65973 
   
 
0,558 
   
0,301  ** 
 
0,550 
   




   
0,393 
   
2,504 
   
0,385  * 
                            Grade school graduate  0,07021 
   
-0,66767 
   
0,07601 
   
-0,66534 
   
 
0,467 
   
0,164  *** 
 
0,440 
   




   
0,173  *** 
 
1,824 
   
0,172  *** 
                            Attended high school  -0,93442 
   
-0,29687 
   
-0,93254 
   
-0,33892 
   
 
0,328  *** 
 
0,159  * 
 
0,285  *** 
 
0,142  ** 
 
 
0,407  ** 
 
0,164  * 
 
0,429  ** 
 
0,159  ** 
                            High school graduate  -0,15075 
   
-0,30241 
   
-0,14727 
   
-0,30778 
   
 
0,251 
   
0,094  *** 
 
0,211 
   




   
0,097  *** 
 
0,307 
   
0,097  *** 
                            Attended post-secondary school  -0,53551 
   
-0,11452 
   
-0,54050 
   
-0,13801 
   
 
0,415 
   
0,177 
   
0,371 
   
0,189 
   
 
1,213 
   
0,201 
   
1,375 
   
0,201 
                              Attended college  0,10965 
   
-0,23259 
   
0,11171 
   
-0,23340 
   
 
0,266 
   
0,095  ** 
 
0,237 
   




   
0,106  ** 
 
0,345 
   
0,106  ** 
                            Work experience abroad  0,02556 
   
0,02277 
   
0,02526 
   
0,02353 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,019 
   
0,006  *** 
 
0,018 
   




   
0,006  *** 
 
0,026 
   
0,006  *** 
                            Work experience abroad  -0,00001 
   
-0,00016 
   
-0,00001 
   
-0,00016 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   




   
0,000  * 
 
0,000 
   
0,000  * 
                            Last left the country   0,04624 
   
0,03614 
   
0,04623 
   
0,04117 
    (in months from 10/1998)  0,023  ** 
 
0,014  *** 
 
0,023  ** 
 
0,016  ** 
  
0,031 
   
0,018  ** 
 
0,033 
   
0,018  ** 
                            Last left the country   -0,00009 
   
-0,00038 
   
-0,00009 
   
-0,00042 
    (in months from 10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000  ** 
 
0,000 
   




   
0,000  * 
 
0,001 
   
0,000  * 
                            Type of visa 
                        (Dummy base category: Working visa) 
                      Immigrant visa  -0,24222 
   
-0,13268 
   
-0,22313 
   
-0,14612 
   
 
0,626 
   
0,208 
   
0,823 
   
0,245 
   
 
3,519 
   
0,265 
   
4,134 
   
0,263 
                              Other visa  -0,74006 
   
-0,26809 
   
-0,73462 
   
-0,32132 
   
 
0,431  * 
 
0,261 
   
0,390  * 
 
0,371 
   
 
0,820 
   
0,401 
   
0,911 
   
0,389 
                              Kind of work in host country 
                        (Dummy base category: Unskilled worker) 
                      Corporate executive, manager,   -0,26854 
   
0,69012 
   
-0,26214 
   
0,67084 
    or proprietor  0,529 
   
0,217  *** 
 
0,588 
   




   
0,211  *** 
 
1,924 
   
0,211  *** 
                            Professional  0,08320 
   
0,28246 
   
0,08262 
   
0,27762 
   
 
0,530 
   
0,164  * 
 
0,380 
   
0,184 
   
 
2,032 
   
0,189 
   
2,466 
   
0,189 
                                                        Technician or associate  -1,01429 
   
0,36344 
   
-1,01250 
   
0,32338 
    professional  0,358  *** 
 
0,167  ** 
 
0,303  *** 
 
0,162  ** 
 
 
0,441  ** 
 
0,179  ** 
 
0,461  ** 
 
0,175  * 
                                                      Clerk  0,13050 
   
0,26012 
   
0,12873 
   
0,27273 
   
 
0,714 
   
0,240 
   
0,484 
   
0,218 
   
 
2,651 
   
0,246 
   
3,279 
   
0,244 
                              Service or sales workers  0,09381 
   
0,23642 
   
0,09415 
   
0,23407 
   
 
0,324 
   
0,116  ** 
 
0,340 
   




   
0,118  ** 
 
0,736 
   
0,118  ** 
                            Tradesman or related worker  -0,24495 
   
0,22926 
   
-0,24443 
   
0,21740 
   
 
0,330 
   
0,123  * 
 
0,283 
   




   
0,114  ** 
 
0,392 
   
0,114  * 
                            Plant & machine operator or  -0,53021 
   
0,30671 
   
-0,52433 
   
0,28759 
    assembler  0,328 
   
0,129  ** 
 
0,295  * 
 




   
0,124  ** 
 
0,426 
   
0,123  ** 
                            Charateristics of host country 
                        By income 
                        (Dummy base category: High income country) 
                      Lower middle-income country  -0,28971 
   
0,27373 
   
-0,27165 
   
0,26338 
   
 
0,568 
   
0,223 
   
0,684 
   
0,211 
   
 
2,600 
   
0,246 
   
2,969 
   
0,243 
                              Upper middle-income country  -0,64087 
   
0,10642 
   
-0,63832 
   
0,08504 
   
 
0,260  ** 
 
0,103 
   
0,258  ** 
 
0,089 
   
 
0,368  * 
 
0,101 
   
0,372  * 
 
0,096 
                              By location 
                        (Dummy base category: In the Middle East) 
                      In Africa, Eastern   -0,15656 
   
0,29615 
   
-0,17789 
   
0,28540 
    and Central Europe  0,790 
   
0,325 
   
0,748 
   
0,197 
    
2,492 
   
0,260 
   
2,888 
   
0,258 
                              In America and Western Europe  -0,21787 
   
0,52214 
   
-0,21282 
   
0,51111 
   
 
0,347 
   
0,119  *** 
 
0,345 
   




   
0,119  *** 
 
0,653 
   
0,117  *** 
                            In South Asia, East Asia,   -0,58627 
   
0,22389 
   
-0,58901 
   
0,20231 
    and the Pacific  0,248  ** 
 
0,102  ** 
 
0,269  ** 
 




   
0,108  ** 
 
0,384 
   
0,104  * 
                            Characteristics of origin household 
                      Labor income (Log)  -0,12163 
   
-0,01813 
   
-0,12009 
   
-0,02160 
   
 
0,053  ** 
 
0,018 
   
0,054  ** 
 
0,017 
   
 
0,079 
   
0,018 
   
0,083 
   
0,017 
                              Asset income  0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
0,000 
                              Male household head  -0,81092 
   
-0,23284 
   
-0,81705 
   
-0,25679 
   
 
0,240  *** 
 
0,091  ** 
 
0,250  *** 
 
0,081  *** 
 
 
0,455  * 
 
0,089  *** 
 
0,473  * 
 
0,086  *** 
                            Age in years of the household  0,10449 
   
0,03426 
   
0,10356 
   
0,03771 
    head  0,096 
   
0,032 
   
0,085 
   
0,031 
   
 
0,131 
   
0,037 
   
0,138 
   
0,037 
                              Age in years of the household  -0,00105 
   
-0,00032 
   
-0,00103 
   
-0,00036 
    head squared  0,001 
   
0,000 
   
0,001 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,002 
   
0,000 
   
0,002 
   
0,000 
                              Number of household members   -0,01040 
   
0,05396 
   
-0,01131 
   
0,05315 
    14 years and younger  0,066 
   
0,026  ** 
 
0,059 
   




   
0,028  * 
 
0,082 
   
0,027  * 
                            Number of household members   0,18531 
   
0,06064 
   
0,18456 
   
0,06522 
    between 15 and 24 years old  0,079  ** 
 
0,029  ** 
 
0,083  ** 
 




   
0,032  * 
 
0,122 
   
0,032  ** 
                            Number of household members   -0,17577 
   
-0,01916 
   
-0,17484 
   
-0,02683 
    25 years and older  0,097  * 
 
0,040 
   
0,082  ** 
 
0,046 
   
 
0,117 
   
0,049 
   
0,120 
   
0,049 
                              (Dummy base category: Resides in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon) 
          Resides in the rest of Luzon  0,11122 
   
-0,07273 
   
0,11465 
   
-0,06538 
   
 
0,216 
   
0,081 
   
0,204 
   
0,081 
   
 
0,265 
   
0,087 
   
0,276 
   
0,086 
                              Resides in the Visayas  -0,15636 
   
-0,03387 
   
-0,15071 
   
-0,03332 
   
 
0,281 
   
0,098 
   
0,249 
   
0,097 
   
 
0,474 
   
0,106 
   
0,577 
   
0,106 
                              Resides in Mindanao  -0,02245 
   
-0,27976 
   
-0,03149 
   
-0,28246 
   
 
0,255 
   
0,108  *** 
 
0,262 
   




   
0,125  ** 
 
0,379 
   
0,125  ** 
                            Constant  -0,52521 
   
8,33060 
   
-0,49063 
   
8,11773 
   
 
1,860 
   
0,859  *** 
 
1,667 
   




   
1,063  *** 
 
2,633 
   
1,044  *** 
                                  
 
                       
  
ρεu   
           
-0,05139 
                      
0,089 
         
             
1,378 
                                    σu 
           
0,78394 
         
             
0,032  +++ 
       
             
0,037  +++ 
                                  σεu 
     
-0,26081 
                (coefficient of inverse Mills' ratio λ) 
   
0,311 
               
       
0,365 
                        
        
        
        
 
                       
  
Log Pseudo Likelihood Function 
           
-966,266 
          Number of observations  766 
   
688 
   
766 
   
688 
            
        
        
           
Note: 
                        The numbers below the coefficient/parameter estimates are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. The first is generated 
from one regression run based on the applicable sample; the second from bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications. 
    *   (+)   -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.1. 
                **  (++)  -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.05. 
                *** (+++) -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.01. 
                 
    
Table 4c : Factors affecting the Incidence and Amount of Remittances, Overseas Workers who are neither Heads nor 
Spouses of Heads of Households  
        
Variable  Probit 
   
ML 
   
 
Selection 
   
Amount 
                        
Endogenous variable
a 
            Labor income (Log)  -0,65251 
   
1,28803 
   
 
0,072  *** 
 
0,977 
   
 
0,213  *** 
                      Characteristics of overseas worker 
          (Dummy base category: Son or daughter) 
          Son- or daughter-in-law  -0,02722 
   
-0,10677 
   
 
0,178 
   
0,294 
   
 
0,222 
                        Grandson or 
granddaughter  0,65565 
   
-1,49319 
   
 
0,399 
   
1,317 
   
 
0,612 
                        Other relative and non-
relative  -0,01601 
   
-0,48550 
   
 
0,193 
   
0,354 
   
 
0,261 
                        Male  -0,25379 
   
0,51770 
   
 
0,121  ** 
 
0,276 
   
 
0,135  * 
                      Married  -0,11053 
   
0,35599 
   
 
0,127 
   
0,248 
   
 
0,164 
                        Age in years  -0,00603 
   
0,00052 
   
 
0,037 
   
0,046 
   
 
0,055 
                        Age in years squared  0,00017 
   
-0,00011 
   
 
0,001 
   
0,001 
   
 
0,001 
                                      (Dummy base category: College graduate) 
          Attended grade school  -1,32811 
   
1,56537 
   
 
0,430  *** 
 
1,513 
   
 
0,540  ** 
                      Grade school graduate  -0,78012 
   
1,06149 
   
 
0,310  ** 
 
1,226 
   
 
0,479 
                        Attended high school  -0,73634 
   
0,90709 
   
 
0,221  *** 
 
1,185 
    
0,345  ** 
                      High school graduate  -0,49592 
   
0,68355 
   
 
0,137  *** 
 
0,864 
   
 
0,231  ** 
                      Attended post-secondary 
school  -0,53112 
   
0,40919 
   
 
0,226  ** 
 
0,697 
   
 
0,314  * 
                      Attended college  -0,33281 
   
0,41287 
   
 
0,119  *** 
 
0,498 
   
 
0,180  * 
                      Work experience abroad  0,02120 
   
-0,04712 
    (in months from 
10/1998)  0,011  * 
 
0,031 
   
 
0,014 
                        Work experience abroad  -0,00014 
   
0,00047 
    (in months from 
10/1998) squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
                       
 
0,01784 
   
-0,01003 
    Last left the country   0,021 
   
0,031 
    (in months from 
10/1998)  0,027 
                       
 
-0,00004 
   
-0,00030 
    Last left the country   0,000 
   
0,000 
    (in months from 
10/1998) squared  0,000 
                                      Type of visa 
            (Dummy base category: Working visa) 
          Immigrant visa  0,06568 
   
-0,13851 
   
 
0,299 
   
0,562 
   
 
0,571 
                        Other visa  -0,29379 
   
1,05030 
   
 
0,337 
   
0,688 
   
 
0,449 
                        Kind of work in host 
country 
            (Dummy base category: Unskilled worker) 
          Other occupations  -0,27939 
   
0,27122 
   
 
0,102  *** 
 
0,364 
   
 
0,135  ** 
                      Charateristics of host 
country 
            By income 
            (Dummy base category: High income country) 
          Lower middle-income  0,09263 
   
-0,20381 
   country 
 
0,217 
   
0,525 
   
 
0,692 
                        Upper middle-income 
country  0,18946 
   
-0,18959 
   
 
0,146 
   
0,309 
   
 
0,163 
                        By location 
            (Dummy base category: In Asia and the Pacific) 
          In the Middle East  0,08349 
   
-0,34909 
   
 
0,141 
   
0,312 
   
 
0,181 
                        In Africa, Eastern   0,43864 
   
-0,13899 
    and Central Europe  0,422 
   
1,150 
   
 
0,969 
                        In America and Western 
Europe  0,30216 
   
-0,35527 
   
 
0,165  * 
 
0,423 
   
 
0,208 
                        Characteristics of origin household 
          Asset income  0,00000 
   
0,00000 
   
 
0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
                        Male household head  -0,13274 
   
0,01544 
   
 
0,106 
   
0,184 
   
 
0,142 
                        Age in years of the 
household  0,00284 
   
-0,04995 
    head  0,026 
   
0,049 
   
 
0,037 
                        Age in years of the 
household  -0,00008 
   
0,00052 
    head squared  0,000 
   
0,000 
   
 
0,000 
                        Number of household 
members   0,00876 
   
0,06541 
    14 years and younger  0,036 
   
0,059 
   
 
0,048 
                        Number of household 
members   0,11572 
   
-0,15211 
    between 15 and 24 years 
old  0,036  *** 
 
0,183 
   
 
0,060  * 
                      Number of household 
members   0,24636 
   
-0,43482 
    25 years and older  0,047  *** 
 
0,367 
    
0,102  ** 
                      (Dummy base category: Resides in NCR, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Central Luzon) 
Resides in the rest of 
Luzon  -0,33998 
   
0,47483 
   
 
0,159  ** 
 
0,689 
   
 
0,238 
                        Resides in the Visayas  -0,53196 
   
1,22258 
   
 
0,130  *** 
 
0,905 
   
 
0,197  *** 
                      Resides in Mindanao  -0,70400 
   
0,71778 
   
 
0,128  *** 
 
1,035 
   
 
0,234  *** 
                      Constant  6,46528 
   
2,67370 
   
 
1,348  *** 
 
9,351 
   
 
2,658  ** 
                            
              ρev  0,81366 
         
 
0,162  *** 
       
 
0,165  *** 
                      σϖlϖ2 
     
-3,89097 
    (coefficient of inverse Mills' ratio λ) 
   
1,662  ** 
                σuv 
     
-9,92397 
   
       
20,716 
                  σv  1,49964 
   
1,03492 
   
 
0,047  +++ 
 
0,036  +++ 
 
 
0,048  +++ 
                      σu 
     
1,95188 
   
       
1,242  + 
 
         
     
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
Function  -1922,620 
   
2321,660 
    Number of observations  875 
   
735 
                        
Note: 
aLabor income is used as endogenous variable in the probit and maximum likelihood estimations of the nonheads subsample.   
The numbers below the coefficient/parameter estimates are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. The first is generated 
from one regression run based on the applicable sample; the second from bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications. 
*   (+)   -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.1. 
**  (++)  -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.05. 
*** (+++) -- significant at two(one)-tailed α = 0.01. 
 